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Traian STOIANOVICH

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ

A Balkan “Archaeology” and the Crisis of Modernity* **Afterword by Dejan Djokić**

ABSTRACT: In this posthumously published essay, Traian Stoianovich traces reasons for the crisis of modernity in the Balkans, from the Late Antiquity to the modern era. Stoianovich approaches the subject from the perspectives of both a micro historian and a transnational and global historian, always in dialogue with other disciplines. He looks at how the development of premodern Balkan nations and their medieval states was impacted by imperial conquests (Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman). He points out at both ruptures and continuities while analysing Balkan societies during the Ottoman era. The question of socioeconomic backwardness is given due consideration. Contrary to popular perceptions, the ideas of Enlightenment reached the Balkans and had an impact on the region, which tried to copy outside models. Following the Protestant Reformation and especially the French Revolution, two models of modernity emerged in Europe: Europe I of liberties (privileges) and Europe II of liberty. Stoianovich argues that among Orthodox Christians in the Balkans advocates of modernity tended to favour Europe II.

KEYWORDS: The Balkans, modernity, Europe, Ottoman Empire, Enlightenment, *histoire total*

Local history and global history are inseparable. “Away from the lime-light of power politics and the direct action of European cabinets,” writes Stevan Pavlowitch, “British policy towards Serbia in the period 1837–1839 provides students of the Eastern Question with an interesting example of Anglo-Rus-

* I am grateful to my colleagues, Rudolph M. Bell and John R. Gillis, for their reading and valued comments.

sian rivalry located in one precise spot and crystallized on one precise issue...”¹ When properly fulfilling his function, moreover, the historian “remains an archaeologist, faced with insufficient, discontinuous and erased traces of past reality. He reconstructs painfully a pattern that is not always rational and that is often opaque that helps to decipher the present but only as part of an indirect and long-term process.”² We shall heed Professor Pavlowitch’s counsel as we explore the foundations of, obstructions to, and opportunities for representative government and democracy in the Balkans.

An Archaeology

The Balkan Peninsula comprises many worlds of time and space. The practices of patriarchal Balkan ethnicities, pastoral and agricultural, go back to 3500–1500 BCE, the era of formation of pre-state ethnicity.³ Other restored “remembrances” stem from Greek antiquity and from about 500 BCE, when Balkan ethnic groups occupying the districts north of Greek settlement began to form states. Along the Mediterranean seacoasts, first the Greek poleis or city-states, and then the Romans founded well-defended colonies. By denying the populations of the Balkan interior direct access to the urbanized Mediterranean and western Asian states, Rome obstructed the further urban development of the emergent Balkan states.

From the Adriatic to the Aegean and Black Seas, from Poland deep into the Balkans, local inhabitants had formed fortified hill sites—*oppida*, as

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- 1 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia, 1837–1839: The Mission of Colonel Hodges*, (Paris, La Haye: Mouton & Co, 1961), 8.
 - 2 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945*, ([London:] Longman; copyright Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1999), 337–338. In “Histories Behind Names: An Interview with Stevan K. Pavlowitch,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 2/2002, 117–125, an interview conducted and edited mostly by Dejan Djokić after a round-table discussion at Kingston University on 28 June 2002, on the occasion of the publication of Pavlowitch’s *Serbia: The History Behind the Name*, (London: Hurst, 2002), Pavlowitch made some interesting statements. After a review of some of the scholars who have influenced his thought, he explained that his interest in the contribution of Serbian visions of medieval Serbia to the making of the nineteenth-century Serbian state arose in part from an earlier ambition, unfulfilled for practical reasons, to be a medievalist. The purpose of his discussion of the myth of St. Vid in the formation of that state and of the concept and ideology of Yugoslavia in the formation of that successor to Serbia and a portion of the Habsburg Monarchy was to invite dialogue on how such myths and ideologies may and must be revised—some persons may contend, even replaced—to create a workable political and cultural entity.
 - 3 Colin Renfrew, “The Identity of Europe in Prehistoric Archaeology,” *Journal of European Archaeology* 2/1994, 153–173.

Julius Caesar called those in Gaul, or *gradine*, as they came to be known to the latter Slav settlers of the Balkans. Often situated at the junction of routes, these hill sites were designed to protect rich grazing, farming, or mining districts. Some of the sites were towns.⁴ Rome coveted their mineral resources. The Balkan states aspired to extend their rule to the sea. In that secular context, the power of Rome prevailed. Preventing the further evolution of the sites as cities, destroying many, absorbing others, and forming dependent towns of their own, Rome thwarted further Balkan state development. To refill the capital's ever-depleted treasury and for private enrichment, it extracted the region's silver. By way of the Sava and Danube rivers, it expedited iron, copper, timber, and other heavy materials to its northern legions.

The Germanic, Slav, Avar, and Bulgar invasions of the third to the seventh century forced a return to Balkan organization on the basis of ethnicity, albeit of new ethnicities—mostly *Scлавiniae* or Slav districts under the authority of *župans* or clan leaders—and new political entities, such as the confederation of twelve clans, tribes, or population groups (*generationes*) of the kingdom of Croatia.⁵ Many old towns declined or disappeared. The Balkans reverted to a rural society.

To compete with German and papal missionary efforts to diffuse their own versions of Christianity among the Moravian and other Slavs, Byzantium—the eastern Roman Empire—adopted a policy of limited *oikonomia*, applying to the sacred sphere the art of “enlightened flexibility,” yielding to the need to translate the holy writ into the language of the Slavs in the Glagolitic and soon

4 Ruth Tringham, “Territorial Demarcation of Prehistoric Settlements,” *Man, Settlement, and Urbanism*, eds. Peter J. Ucko, Ruth Tringham, G. W. Dibbley, (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd, 1972), 463–475; John Bintliff, “Iron Age Europe in the Context of Social Evolution from the Bronze Age Through to Historical Times”, *European Social Evolution: Archaeological Perspectives*, ed. John Bintliff, (Bradford, West Yorkshire: University of Bradford, [1984]), 157–225; Alojz Benac, „O etničkim zajednicama starijeg Željeznog doba”, *Praistorija jugoslavenskih zemalja*, V, *Željezno doba*, (Sarajevo, 1987), 737–802; Michael N. Geselowitz, “The Role of Iron Production in the Formation of an ‘Iron Age Economy’ in Central Europe,” *Research in Economic Anthropology* 10/1988, 225–255; Michael N. Geselowitz, “Technology and Social Change: Ironworking in the Rise of Social Complexity in Iron Age Central Europe,” *Tribe and Polity in Late Prehistoric Europe: Demography, Production, and Exchange in the Evolution of Complex Social Systems*, eds. D. Blair Gibson, Michael N. Geselowitz, (New York; London: Plenum Press, 1988), 137–154; Andrew Sherratt, “The Human Geography of Europe: A Prehistoric Perspective”, *An Historical Geography of Europe*, eds. A. Butlin, R. A. Dodgshon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 1–25.

5 Milan Šufflay, *Srbi i Arbanasi (njihova simbioza u srednjem vijeku)*, (Beograd, 1925), 54.

thereafter the Cyrillic script.⁶ It prevailed on the Bulgar ruler of the pagan eastern Balkan Slavs and the notability of the Serb Sclaviniae to embrace Christianity and Byzantium's prestigious architecture, iconography, chrematistics, aesthetics, and ideology. Under papal authority, the Croats adopted the Glagolitic and Latin scripts. The Serbs and Bulgarian Slavs accepted the Cyrillic script.

State making continued to the middle of the fifteenth century. Literacy spread widely. New market towns were formed. A three-field system of agriculture spread. Wine growing and fruit growing expanded. To fulfil the fodder needs of their warhorses and other livestock, the nobility ameliorated their prairies. Mining enterprises—in particular, the mining of silver—grew in Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, especially following the introduction in the region, presumably after the Mongol invasion of 1240, of Saxon miners from Transylvania. Exported to Dubrovnik and Venice, this silver compensated for the depleted silver production of Alpine Europe. In the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth century, Serbian and Bosnian silver paid for western Europe's imports of eastern spices.⁷

North and west of Serbia, known to the Serbs not by this neo-Latin name but as Ras and more vaguely as the “Serbian lands,” there arose in the twelfth century a Croat-Hungarian dual state of the Roman Catholic faith. Committed to combating schism (Eastern Orthodoxy), heresy, and paganism, and making little distinction between the three practices, this state barred Serbian expansion to the Adriatic and Bosnia, the vassal principality of the king of Hungary and Croatia. In control of the Morava route to the Danube, Byzantium obstructed Serb expansion in that direction until the tax revolt in the 1180s of the Vlach and Cumanian pastoral populations of the Black-Sea Byzantine duchy of Paristrion. Under the inspiration of a Slav-Macedonian millennialism, the Slavic Bulgarian farmers of the lower Danube supported the revolt, succeeding in creating a new Bulgarian state.⁸ Culminating in the partition of Byzantium, the disorders of the Fourth Crusade provided opportu-

6 Marie-José Mondzain, *Image, icône, économie: les sources byzantines de l'imaginaire contemporain*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, [1996]), 28–29.

7 An excellent introduction to a variety of aspects of Serbian, Bosnian, and generally South Slavic political, social, economic, and cultural history is the collection of articles by Sima M. Ćirković, *Rabotnici, vojnici, duhovnici: društva srednjovekovnog Balkana*, ur. Vlastimir Đokić, (Beograd: Equilibrium, 1997). On agriculture, see Miloš Blagojević, *Zemljoradnja u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji*, (Beograd: Istorijski institut, 1973), summary in English: “Agriculture in Mediaeval Serbia”, 415–429.

8 In “National Consciousness in Medieval Bulgaria,” *Südost-Forschungen* 27/1968, 1–27, Marin Pundeff maintains that “national consciousness” prevailed in Bulgaria already in the ninth and tenth centuries. It is more likely, however, that Bulgar rulers took advantage

nities for the assertion of new states, including a Serbia sustained by its own new autocephalous Orthodox church.

Evoked by the translation of the Bible in the ninth century into Slavic, the question of the property of translating sacred texts from a recognized written language into the language of a barbarian culture had been broached already in the fourth century by the translation of the Bible into Gothic. The question of the legitimacy of a new language of "universal" empire, Slavic in addition to Greek, was resolved in the mid-fourteenth century by the decision of the Serb emperor Stefan Dušan to transform his expanded state into a kind of a dual state, an "Empire of the Serbs and Greeks." In old territories, the laws continued to be Serbian. In the recently annexed territories, the new lords were Serbs. The Byzantine laws, however, were maintained unless they were in conflict with the new Law Code (*Zakonik*), which was enacted in 1349 and 1353/54 with the collaboration of Dušan's nobility and Orthodox clergy.

Did this policy represent a nod to nationalism? And what was the significance of the title of Tvrtko I Kotromanić, who, in 1377, was crowned, word for word, "king to the Serbs and of Bosnia and to the Littoral and Western Parts"?⁹ Was there a national sentiment in the medieval Balkan states? Marc Bloch and René Rémond suggest a possible approach to this question.¹⁰ As in western Europe, the clergy—the intelligentsia of the time—linked language and culture to state and religion. In the later Ottoman state, the favored religion was Islam, the faith of the Ottoman Turks. In the Orthodox and Roman Catholic territories of the Ottoman conquests, however, churches and priests became the conservatories of religious-national identity. For most Balkan Christians, Slavs and Greeks in particular, converts to Islam simply became "Turks." The "other" always existed. Not until after 1840, however, was there a systematized ideology and rhetoric of nationalism.

Also of importance is the nature of the Byzantine and Balkan medieval states. From the death of Emperor Constantine to the end of the sixth century, maintains Dean Miller, the imperial office was defined in Byzantium as "a secular military and legal center of limited authority". An "increasingly dominant Christian church" checked its pretension to sacral power. The transfor-

of the ethnic consciousness of the Slavs in the state, who were far more numerous than the Bulgars, to consolidate state authority.

9 Sima M. Ćirković, "Sāborā," *Rabotnici, vojnici, duhovnici*, 339.

10 Marc Bloch, *La société féodale, II. Les classes et le gouvernement des hommes*, XXXIV, bis de *L'Évolution de l'Humanité*, dir. Henri Berr, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1949), 231–240; René Rémond, *Religion et société en Europe: essai sur la sécularisation des sociétés européennes aux XIXe et XXe siècles (1789–1998)*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998), 145–167.

mation of the civil-military authority from *autokratôr* to *pantokratôr*—from ruler in the military and civil spheres to ruler in all spheres—occurred under Zoroastrian influence. Inspired by Persia’s occupation of its western Asian territories, Byzantine absolutism was also a riposte to the Slavic invasion of the Balkans and the Lombard invasion of northern Italy.¹¹

Subsequently, however, a body of Byzantine opinion maintained that the Emperor was subject to written law, the laws of piety, and the customary laws of *oikonomia*, local tradition, and status privilege.¹² In the diminished Byzantine state of the fifteenth century, affirms Speros Vryonis, the “intellectual climate” of church, state, and society “was probably freer, or more permissive,” “than at any time before.”¹³

Available to Stefan Dušan’s Serbia were both the Byzantine critique of absolutism and a model of a government of law of Slavic and European inspiration. In mutual mimesis, in response to common opportunities—an expanding money, commercial, and urban economy – and in order to quell disorders that might arise from the growth of the power of great lords, four rulers of Slavic lands— Casimir III (1333–70) of Poland, Charles IV (1342–78) of Bohemia, Ljudevit (Louis) I (1342–82) of Croatia and Hungary, and Stefan Dušan (1331–55) of Serbia – codified the laws of their lands. The object of the law codes was to affirm the supreme executive authority of the ruler, subject like everyone to the rule of law, and to assure tranquillity and order and the unhindered movement of travellers, messages, and goods.¹⁴

Before they could fully institute governments of law and economy under the protection of the law but relatively free to follow the laws of supply and demand, and conditions conducive to forming a secular intelligentsia, Byzan-

11 Dean A. Miller, “An Imperial Metamorphosis: Persia and the Construction of Absolute Authority in Rome”, *Actes de la Société Belge d’Études Celtiques: Actes des deuxièmes rencontres d’anthropologie du monde indo-européen et de mythologie compare, Métamorphoses*, 1, in *Ollodagos*, XIII, 1, (Bruxelles, 1999), 109–133.

12 Paul Magdalino, “Aspects of the Twelfth-Century Byzantine *Kaiserkritik*”, *Tradition and Transformation in Medieval Byzantium*, (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum [1991]), 326–345.

13 Speros Vryonis Jr., “The ‘Freedom of Expression’ in Fifteenth Century Byzantium”, *Penn-Paris-Dumbarton Oaks Colloquia, La notion de liberté au Moyen âge, session des 12–15 octobre 1982*, ([Paris]: Les Belles Lettres, n.d.), 271.

14 Marko Kostrenčić, “Dušanov Zakonik kao odraz stvarnosti svog vremena”, *Zbornik u čast šeste stogodišnjice Zakonika cara Dušana*, ur. Nikola Radojčić, (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka, 1951), Vol. I, 27–44; Nikola Radojčić, „Dušanov Zakonik i vizantisko pravo”, *Zbornik u čast šeste stogodišnjice Zakonika cara Dušana*, ur. Nikola Radojčić, (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka, 1951), 45–77.

tium, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary fragmented and/or disappeared. The empires of the Ottoman Turks, of Venice, and of the Habsburgs replaced them. The *krajine* or borderlands were militarized. After the Balkan break with its European past by submission to Roman rule, after a compromise solution later in the Middle Ages between two religious cultures—Latin and Greek—and a more or less common European civil culture, came, under Ottoman rule, a break with that civil culture.

The Ottoman Empire had just laws. The ruler himself, however, was not subject to the law—except the “law” of violence. When far removed from the capital or when the central government was weak, Ottoman administrators followed the example of the ruler. They behaved despotically. But as the British political thinker Walter Bagehot astutely remarked, despotism divides men, and it hinders the rise of “free argument.”¹⁵ To satisfy pastoral groups upon whose military support they were dependent, and to provide their cities and soldiery with meat, dairy products, wool, and hides, the Ottomans tried to strike a balance between the foregoing needs and the requirements of the capital, other cities, and their armed forces in cereals and other farm products. Promoting farming in fertile districts near navigable rivers and maritime coasts, they advantaged grazing and transhumance in extensive highland and lowland pastures.

Many stock raisers, however, writes Fikret Adanır, “were organized into quasi-military categories and developed a consciousness of higher social status. These semimilitary pastoral groups felt superior to the reaya [cultivator] peasants.” They “resisted fiercely whenever their ‘privileges’ were in jeopardy.” There arose at the same time a category of unregistered soldiers and privateers known as *levend*. Providing their own handguns, they were recruited from growing groups of unemployed youth and bachelors. Roaming freely everywhere, they entered the service of local landlords, other notables, municipalities, and provincial governors. Instead of assuring security, they

15 Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics, or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of “Natural Selection” and Inheritance to Public Society*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 69, 154, 162–63, 172, 190.

engendered insecurity.¹⁶ As a result, in the seventeenth century, farming declined precipitously.¹⁷

Ottoman society further functioned as two sets of corporate orders. One set comprised functional orders of four “pillars”—men of the law, men of the sword, merchants and craftsmen, and peasants. The other was made up of four separate but unequal religious communities called *millets*: adherents of Islam, Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Gregorian (Monophysite) Armenians (together with Roman Catholics, Nestorians, and Jacobites). Each group was under the authority of its principal religious leader. Many privileges accorded to members of the Islamic community were denied to the others except by special grant.¹⁸

The economy was organized in part as a command system. Under the *narh* system of price regulation, a judge in Istanbul, in consultation with merchants and shipmasters, determined the maximum price for consumer goods. These price ceilings were served as a guide for price ceilings in other parts of the state, where provincial judges and market inspectors adjusted prices to suit local conditions.¹⁹ Other price controls were applied to raw materials needed in the manufacture of goods of military use.

Similar pricing systems existed in western Europe. But after Austria stymied the Ottoman advance into Europe during the Fifteen Years’ War of 1592–1606 and especially after the war of 1683–1699, and until after 1830, fearing that good roads might facilitate foreign military penetration and the cultural pollution of their lands, Ottoman governments turned away from the improvement of roads. In the 1590s, having failed to reach the Atlantic to ob-

16 Fikret Adanır, “Tradition and Rural Change in Southeastern Europe during the Ottoman Rule”, *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Daniel Chirot, (Berkeley, Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, [1989]), 135, 141.

17 Traian Stoianovich, “Cities, Capital Accumulation, and the Ottoman Balkan Command Economy, 1500–1800”, *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, eds. Charles Tilly, Wim P. Blockmans, (Boulder, San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 60–99.

18 For further details, see Traian Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe*, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 155–157; Traian Stoianovich, “The Social Foundations of Balkan Politics, 1750–1941,” *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, 4 vols, (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1992–1995), III, 111–113.

19 Halil İnalçık, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300–1600”, *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, eds. Halil İnalçık, Donald Quataert, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46; Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1690–1699”, *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, eds. Halil İnalçık, Donald Quataert, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 466, 535.

tain direct access to the products of the New World, they closed the Black Sea to international shipping.

In Europe, road and vehicle improvement allowed regional price differences to be scaled down. In the half-closed economy of the Ottoman Empire, in contrast, the prices of consumer goods in normal years diminished rapidly, almost geometrically, with the distance of the place of production from a port or commercial route, and with the distance from the capital, to which a certain proportion of goods was automatically diverted from the geographically accessible producing areas. As a result, the normal price of victuals in the Balkans toward the end of the sixteenth century fell to under a third of the price prevalent in the commercially highly active Thames-Scheldt/Escaut-Rhine-Po corridor (Lotharingia) or successor to the fairs of Champagne.²⁰ Commercialized already in the twelfth century and organized, writes John R. Lampe, "on a market rather than a military basis," the Champagne fairs yielded to the corridor, which, after 1600, slowly extended both eastward and westward.²¹ Sustained by the silver and other resources of the "new world," with which it paid for the prestige goods and manufactures of Asia, it became the nucleus of a Western Europe with a capital "W."

The merger of the Ottoman systems of price fixing, tax farming, monopolies, and the subcontracting of monopolies allowed Ottoman notables—Islamic, Jewish, and Christian—to obtain control both of administratively priced goods for which demand existed in the capital and of raw materials intended for export to Europe. This gave them an incentive to oppose the expansion of Ottoman manufactures. In this way and by Russia's ability, by its wars of 1768 to 1829, to force open the commerce of the Black Sea to international

20 Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in the Ottoman Empire: Taxation, Trade, and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800*, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981), 7; Niels Steensgard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 40–42; Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds*, 77–85, 191–195; Stoianovich, "Cities, Capital Accumulation, and the Ottoman Balkan Command Economy", 73–78.

21 Georges Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century*, trans. Howard B. Clarke, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974; French language edition copyright Éditions Gallimard, 1973; English translation copyright Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), 262–268; John R. Lampe, "Imperial Borderlands or Capitalist Periphery? Redefining Balkan Backwardness, 1520–1914", *The Origins Backwardness in Eastern Europe*, 180.

shipping, the autonomous Ottoman political economy was transformed into a dependent political economy.²²

Mimesis of Modernity: Communication, Politics, and Economics

Unlike despotism, free argument tends to foster a propensity to sift and weigh evidence—a critical spirit conducive to the elaboration of what Edgar Morin calls a “dialogic culture.”²³ The very root of this last word, Latin *modo*, means “now.” It explains a second characteristic of the culture, a predilection for the current. That accounts for its instability. A third quality of malleable modernity is the disposition to extend the idea of individuality, which was long restricted to gods, priests, and heroes, to all men and women, initially by the propagation of the Christian concept of individual responsibility. Western Europe thus diverged from Ottoman ways.

Europe’s privileged sought to confine individuality to persons of their own status. By embracing the idea of fashion, however, by recognizing the right of the powerful, the privileged, and eventually the well-to-do to manifest their individuality not only by the display of luxuries but also frequent periodic changes in style of dress and furnishings,²⁴ they laid the foundation for a shift from “wasteful consumption” confined to themselves and to the religious sphere to wasteful consumption extended to all spheres and to wider segments of society.²⁵

Fashion is discourse. It probably could not have been instituted except in a dialogic culture. By their receptivity to fashion, the European cultures became the most mimetic cultures in the world. Economists and economic historians identify mimesis as the “demonstration effect.”²⁶ Man, contends René Girard, is “the most mimetic animal,” but he “does not [always] know what to

22 Traian Stoianovich, “Russian Domination in the Balkans”, *Between East and West*, 63–91.

23 Edgar Morin, *Penser l'Europe*, (Paris: Gallimard [1987]), 127–129.

24 Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe–XVIIIe siècle*, 3 vols, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), I; *Les structures du quotidien: Le possible et l'impossible*, 271–290; English translation by Siân Reynolds, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, 3 vols, (London: William Collins Sons; New York: Harper and Row, 1982–1984), I; *The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible*, 311–333; Traian Stoianovich, “Theoretical Implications of Braudel’s *Civilisation matérielle*”, *Journal of Modern History* 1/1969, 68–81.

25 Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*, (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918; copyright 1899, 1912 by the Macmillan Company), 96–98, 119, 172–177, 332.

26 Roumen Daskalov, “Ideas about and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans,” *East European Quarterly* 2/1997, 146; Andrew C. Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern*

desire." He "turns to others in order to make up his mind."²⁷ The others whom he consults are those he deems most powerful or most prestigious, or those who teach him to desire and what to desire in order to obtain an intended result.

The initial impulse to the human propensity for mimesis may have stemmed from "the interaction of the ritual [representation] with linguistic form."²⁸ The quasi-sacralization of free argument, however, acted to impel the diversion of investment from religion to the discourse of fashion and to vernacular discourse, which subsequently became national. By the late 1790s, the encyclopaedist Jacques Peuchet perceived a further shift. Work, he argued, is punishment. People tolerate it, however, if it produces a pleasure—*une jouissance*—of consumption, generator of production.²⁹ The foregoing sequences of change are part of the pattern of malleability of modernity—or at least of the malleability of European modernity.

The late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century economist, Thorstein Veblen, perceived another turn, however—from the metaphysical to "machine technology," which he defined as a "leveller, a vulgarizer, whose end seems to be the extirpation off all that is respectable, noble, and dignified in human intercourse and ideals."³⁰ This last turn might signal the end of modernity. In contrast, the Italian writer Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944) perceived the same turn in a favorable light. As advocate of a "wireless imagination," of writing without punctuation, of language without syntax, articles, adjectives, or adverbs, limited to nouns and to verbs in the infinitive form, of a language of action and combat, Marinetti aspired to mechanize language,

World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, [2001]), 18–21, 409.

27 *Violent Origins: Walker Barkert, René Girard, and Jonathan C. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation*, ed. Robert G. Hammerton-Kelly, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, [1987]), 121–126; Eric Gans, *The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles; London: University of California press, [1981]), 11; F. R[onald] H. Englefield, *Language: Its Origin and Its Relation to Thought*, eds. G. A. Wells, D. R. Oppenheimer, (London: Elek Books Ltd for Pemberton Publishing Co. Ltd., 1977), 28–37, chapter on "Imitation."

28 Gans, *The Origin of Language*, 212, 215.

29 Jacques Peuchet, "Introduction à l'étude de la géographie commerçante, contenant l'histoire des progrès du commerce, de la culture, de l'industrie manufacturière, de l'aperçu des principes et de la théorie du commerce", *Dictionnaire universel de la géographie commerçante*, 5 vols, (Paris: chez Blanchon, an VII–an VIII), Vol. I, cccxlv–cccxlvi.

30 Thorstein Veblen, "The Cultural Incidence of the Machine Process", *What Veblen Taught: Selected Writings of Thorstein Veblen*, ed. Wesley C. Mitchell, (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1964; copyright 1936 by the Viking Press), 353–356, extracted from T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprises*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), 302–373.

give it “the beauty of speed,” form it on the model of the roaring erotic racing car, “more beautiful than the *Victory of Samothrace*.”³¹ Herald of Futurism, a form of postmodernity before the name, he perceived this turn not as an end but as a new beginning.

Changes in mimetic innovation reflect patterns of change in the conception of time and space.³² High correlation exists between periodic spurts of major mimetic change and changes in the modes and agents of communication. The domestication of the horse, the diffusion of wheeled vehicles, and the introduction of river and sea navigation led to the rise of long-distance commerce between the peoples of Mesopotamia and the Caucasus and the peoples of the Danube. The diffusion of alphabetic scripts, the growth of literacy, improvements in maritime navigation, and the invention of coinage between the eighth and fifth centuries BCE culminated in modes of thinking suited to “larger and larger human groupings.”³³ These innovations facilitated the emergence of the classical Greek polis and larger states. Harold A. Innis hypothesizes, indeed, that

*Concentration on a medium of communication implies a bias in the cultural development of the civilization concerned either towards an emphasis on space and political organization or towards an emphasis on time and religious organization. Introduction of a second medium tends to check the bias of the first and to create conditions suited to the growth of empire. The Byzantine empire emerged from a fusion of a bias incidental to papyrus in relation to political organization and of parchment in relation to ecclesiastical organization. The dominance of parchment in the West gave a bias towards ecclesiastical organization which led to the introduction of paper with its bias toward political organization. With printing, paper facilitated an effective development of the vernaculars and gave expression to their vitality in the growth of nationalism.*³⁴

The spread of literacy and the diffusion of the printing press spurred a secularized literature, culminating in the works of Dante, Boccaccio, and Mach-

31 Marjorie Perloff, *The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant Guerre, and the Language of Rupture*, (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 57–58, 89.

32 Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 7.

33 Andrew Sherratt, “Reviving the Grand Narrative: Archaeology and Long-Term Change,” *Journal of European Archaeology* 3/1995, 18–19, 24–25.

34 Harold A. Innis, *Empire and Communication*, revised by Mary Q. Innis, foreword by Marshall McLuhan, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972; original version published in 1950 by Oxford University Press), 170.

iavelli in Italy, Chaucer and Shakespeare in England, and Rabelais in France. In the "Merry England" of Shakespeare, a literature of Tragedy, Pathos, and Mirth, analogous to the literature in classical Greece of Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Aristophanes, fostered the expansion of secularized forms of individuality and sociability—a youth culture, a confusion of values, and "reason of state," that last designed both to replace and to reinforce religion.³⁵ Illustrative and agents of this evolution were terms with the prefix *self* that came into use in England: one new self-word every five years between 1530 and 1550, one new self-word every two years between 1550 and 1599, and one new self-word each year between 1600 and 1649.³⁶

In the suite of national languages came a downgrading of the cultures of local groups. Superseding them, writes Ernest Gellner, appear "a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological [technical or professional might be more appropriate terms] communication."³⁷

This did not occur without the intervention of politics and economics. David Ricardo assigned priority to the economic over the political on the ground that the economic acts mechanistically, whereas the political is governed by the rules and desires of individuals and groups. At the core of the problem of the economy, however, as the Physiocrats knew, is the fact that land is the source both of wealth and of a surplus. How one deals with land affects the size and movement of surpluses through the system of economic circulation. Decisions may aid or obstruct economic growth.³⁸

Here enters the Barrington Moore thesis. Moore maintains that there have been "three main routes to the modern world [three patterns of modernity after the resources or land of the "new world" began to be available to Europeans]. The earliest one combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy after a series of revolutions: the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolu-

35 Zevedei Barbu, *Problems of Historical Psychology*, (New York: Grove Press, [1962]), 155–179.

36 For the self-words, see *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*, complete text reproduced micrographically, 2 vols, (Oxford, London; Glasgow; New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 409–427. For further discussion of this subject, see Trajan Stojanović, „Opšta evropska gramatika,” trans. Vlastimir Đokić, *Nin*, 30. 12. 1990, *specijalni novogodišnji broj*, 65–69. The unpublished original English typescript is entitled "A Common European Grammar."

37 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 57.

38 Stephen Gudeman, *Economics as Culture: Models and Metaphors of Livelihood*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1986]), 52–53.

tion, and the American Civil War... The second path was also a capitalist one, but in the absence of a strong revolutionary surge, it passed [in Germany in particular] through reactionary political forms to culminate in fascism.” In the third course of communism in Russia and China, revolutions had “their main but not exclusive origins among the peasants.” The three patterns differed because they were undertaken under differing historical and geographic circumstances. Moore also argues, however, that “The methods of modernization chosen in one country change the dimensions of the problem for the next countries who take the step.”

In pursuit of modernity, England possessed an advantage. It had a well-developed notion of liberties—“the” immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of authority.” From diverse liberties, it could eventually arrive at the abstract concept of a common liberty. It did so by possession of a Parliament, “a flexible institution” that could embrace new desires and claims. “If Parliament emerged from the Civil War mainly as an instrument of a commercially minded, landed upper class, it was not just that... The fact that this class had developed an economic base which had brought it into violent opposition with the Crown before the Civil War had a great deal to do with the strengthening of Parliament...”³⁹

The economic base was the commercialization of land in England, its mobilization of land as a “good” or commodity. In particular, it was the boom in the English land market for half a century after 1580.⁴⁰ Robert Brenner is right. The transformation of precapitalist (what I would call premodern) property relations into what he calls capitalist relations was not an automatic process that simply grew out of the expansion of commerce in goods. It required a rise in agricultural productivity, the commercialization of the land.⁴¹

Parliaments are communication systems between government and interest groups. The institutionalization of political modernity, however, required a reworking of that relationship, the elaboration of new forms of state

39 Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, (Boston: Beacon Press, copyright 1966 by Barrington Moore, Jr.), 413-415, 9, in that order.

40 *Ibid.*, 6, 10-11. For an attempt to relate the Moore thesis to Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, as well as Hungary and Bohemia, see Gale Stokes, *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), especially 36-66, 77-82.

41 Robert Brenner, “Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe in Light of Developments in the West”, *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe*, 15-52; John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, “Economic Development in Historical Perspective,” *American Economic Review* 2/1969, 386-400.

to conform with the political imaginaries of new interest groups—a growing intellectual class and *gessellschaftlich* voluntary associations of interest groups designed to curb localism, which one could freely join and depart from.

One resultant imaginary product of the fusion of French Physiocratic and liberal thought was the nation state. Its roots go back to the Europe of state nations, dynastic loyalty, and privileges (literally, private laws). Under the revised Physiocratic-liberal scheme of things, however, sovereignty shifted from the prince to the people—to men (rarely women) of property defined as active citizens. A unitary version of this conception, that of the Jacobin abbé Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, maintained that there would be no need for intermediaries between citizen property owners and their national assembly. A second version held that the process required the formation of interest groups, which, taking advantage of the new media of communication—pamphlets, news-sheets, and periodicals—would become the molders of public opinion. Known in mid-eighteenth-century France as *sociétés libres* or *sociétés de pensée*, such intercommunicating groups perceived their role as that of diffusing an *esprit de société*,⁴² the consciousness of being part of a larger common endeavor—a civilization which they christened with the quasi-religious name *Lumières*.

Some groups aspired to constitute an autonomous sector—a public sphere, sometimes called a civil society—which, in concert with two other autonomous spheres, the state and the market economy, would act to assure the well-being of more or less all.⁴³ A modified Sieyès version of the role of intermediate groups that prevailed in France ultimately accepted the need for such groups without consenting to their function as a sector equal to the state conceived as the unitary representative and embodiment of the nation. Alexis de Tocqueville cautioned that a three-sector society can be made to work only “when a great number of men consider a great number of things in the same point of view, when they hold the same opinions on many subjects and

42 Victor Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau, *L'Ami des hommes*, première partie: *Traité de la population*, (Avignon, 1756), 2–6; Victor Riqueti de Mirabeau, François de Quesnay, *Éléments de la philosophie rurale*, (La Haye: chez les Libraires Associés, 1767), vi, xiii; Claude-Adrien Helvétius, *De l'esprit*, (Paris: chez Durand, 1758), 53, 177, 189, 297, 314, 321, 326, 330, 344, 350–356; François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, new revised and corrected edition, (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 39–40, 47, 49–51, 56–61, 213, 222–225.

43 Robert Wuthnow, “The Voluntary Sector: Legacy of the Past, Hope for the Future”, *Between States and Markets: The Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective*, ed. R. Wuthnow, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [1991]), 7; Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991), 20, 35; Sudipta Kaviraj, *Civil Society: History and Possibilities*, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 319–320.

when the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions to their minds.”⁴⁴ It can succeed only if the legitimacy of the state is not questioned and its citizens can expect more benefits than drawbacks from its maintenance.

A second imaginary, the representative empire, assumed two forms, one of which Edmund Burke identified as old English and American and the other, inferentially, as new English. The British Parliament was not “a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each much maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; [it is rather] a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole, where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.” Americans, on the other hand, favored the representation of local interests.⁴⁵ Burke’s view of the state did not differ radically from that of the French Jacobins. He opposed the Jacobin project mainly out of fear that it might create a stronger France.

In either form, the imaginary included the means to the attainment of its goals. In one case, it did so by Adam Smith’s call upon Britain to “expand her colonial empire, seizing the islands from the Falklands to the Philippines” in order to gain control of the Pacific.⁴⁶ In the second case, before independence, Americans were voicing their aspiration to a whole that would hold together the separate parts by giving a share to all parts in the resources (land) of the common whole, a continental territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific constituted as a prosperity sphere. *The Federalist Papers* (1788) and subsequent acts ratified the goal.⁴⁷

The advantage of a representative empire over empires of non-representative type derived from its claim to legitimacy not primarily on the basis of territorial conquest but of representation. Its advantage over state nation and nation state arose from its continental size or control of the seas, which

44 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols, (New York: Allyn and Bacon, 1899), I, 398; Alexis de Tocqueville, “Comment les Américains comprennent l’égalité de l’homme et de la femme”, *Oeuvres complètes*, definitive edition, ed. J.-P. Mayer, Vol. I, part 2: *De la démocratie en Amérique*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), 220.

45 Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1967, copyright by the Fellows of Harvard College), 162–164. Burke made this statement in a speech in 1774 to the electors in Bristol.

46 Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, and World, a Harvester Book, [1955]), 150.

47 Mrs. L. K. Matthews, “Benjamin Franklin’s Plans for a Colonial Union, 1750–1775,” *American Political Science Review* 3/1914, 393–412; Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, with an introduction, table of contents, and index of ideas by Clinton Rossiter, (New York: A Menlo Book from New American Library, 1961).

assured it of abundance. Once the two representative empires were in place, they became obstacles to the formation of other representative empires. Only under exceptional circumstances could the representative empire be a suitable model of mimesis.

A third imaginary, as a German complement to and backlash against French power and ideas, surfaced shortly after 1800. The author was Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), exponent of an Enlightenment philosophy of freedom and individuality, who initially welcomed French revolutionary ideas. Individuality, maintained Fichte, derives from “duplicity”—from doing and reflecting upon what one has done. Reflection becomes a regular practice, however, only with the formation of society, initially defined as a collectivity in which some members are free to use constraint in order to bring the rest to reason. Individuality and society arise simultaneously, creating an *Ich*, or identity, both personal and societal. Where self-constraint is absent, there is no society, but there is also no individuality.

In a course of 1804–5 at the Berlin Academy on the “Characteristics of the Present Age,” Fichte hypothesized that the world would pass through five epochs before achieving its divinely inspired goal of a society of maximum freedom: a first epoch of instinctive reason, a second epoch in which a minority uses constraint to achieve an order compatible with its own reason, a third epoch—Enlightening—in which reason is applied to a few spheres of life, a fourth epoch in which science and reason are extended to all spheres, and a fifth epoch of the art of reason. Each epoch reflects the current state of knowledge and science (*Wissenschaftslehre*) in the world’s leading societies. In 1800, these were in an early phase of the third epoch.

In his Berlin course of the winter of 1807–8, his famous *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1809), which he delivered under the impact of Prussia’s recent defeat by Napoleon, he called upon Germans to assume world cultural leadership. By their history, by their rich original language, neither borrowed from others nor corrupted by foreign accretions, by their role as builders of a Christian Europe, they had demonstrated their worthiness as a people chosen of God. To continue in the role for which they were destined, they must respond to the quickening of events, prepare for entry into the fourth epoch. They must lay the groundwork to train “the whole man,” finish an entirely new self, “universal and national”.

This goal demanded the separation from their homes of the current generation of the young of both sexes so that they were not infected by the prejudices, ignorance, and weaknesses of their parents. The young would be brought up in schools of universal national education of love of fatherland,

which individual German states, princes, landlords, municipalities, volunteer associations, and other benefactors would institute in order to found the fourth epoch of “the empire of the spirit and of reason.” The schools would rejuvenate the German nation. Works of art, they would constitute a virtual state committed to combating evil and furthering the advancement of a divinely inspired freedom-creative reason. They would seize for Germany its destined role of European leadership from a France guilty of betraying its Christian past.⁴⁸

Read without the aid of the “Characteristics of the Present Age,” Fichte’s *Reden an die deutsche Nation* may authorize other interpretations, including a justification of the “totalitarian” state. The *Reden* have inspired German and other nationalisms. In light of Arthur Schopenhauer’s conception of the role of reason in history, which Hans Kohn interprets as “no more than an instrument for the desires and interests of the eternally unsatisfied will,”⁴⁹ one cannot but regard them as an aspiration to German empowerment.

48 Günter Zöllner, “Thinking and Willing in Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity”, *New Perspectives on Fichte*, eds. Tom Rockmore, Daniel Breazeale, (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1996), 9–11; Daniel Morrison, “Women, Family, and State in Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy and Political Praxis,” trans. by Christina Bianchi-Murillo and Daniel Breazeale, *New Perspectives on Fichte*, eds. Tom Rockmore, Daniel Breazeale, (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1996), 193–94, 198–200, 203, 205–209; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Le caractère de l’époque actuelle*, translation and preface by Ives Radrizzani, (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1990), 25–29, 36–40, 58–59, 77–78, 139–140, 150, 155–157, 162–165, 175–180, 193, 212, 222–224, 229–237, 249; [Johann Gottlieb Fichte], *Fichtes Reden an die deutsche Nation*, eingeleitet von Rudolf Eucken, (Leipzig: Im Insel Verlag, 1925), 60, 63–69, 74–75, 83–84, 104–106, 109, 113–117, 136–141, 151–152, 164–165; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, edited and with an introduction by George Armstrong Kelly, (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1968), 1–2, 10–12, 21, 27, 35, 38, 139–159, 184, 220–225; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Rufe an die deutsche Nation*, Schriften und Reden ausgewählt von Dr. Hans Schmoldt, (Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP Franz Eher, 1943), 5, 35–36, 45–50, 58–61, 94–101; Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 3rd ed., (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966), 38–50, 53–54, 82–83; Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), 336–344; Hans Kohn, *Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789–1815*, (Princeton, N.J., Toronto, London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), 229–246.

49 Hans Kohn, *Revolutions and Dictatorships: Essays in Contemporary History*, (Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, reprint 1969 by arrangement with Harvard University Press; copyright 1939 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, copyright 1966 by Hans Kohn), 208–209.

Discontinuity, Asymmetry, and the Crisis of Modernity

In the Serb lands of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as in central-European Bohemia, writes Robin Okey, cultural, social, and economic attainments were "by no means" far inferior to those of western Europe.⁵⁰ As of the 1490s, when most of their lands were already under Ottoman rule, Serbs introduced small printing presses from Venice first in Montenegro and then in other Serb lands. Before the end of the next century, these presses were lost or melted down to make weapons for use against the Turks. Between 1500 and 1600, no more than five books a year were printed in the Ottoman Empire. Between 1600 and 1700 the average fell to one book a year. It rose to four a year between 1700 and 1800. The Ottoman publication record between 1493 and 1828 barely exceeded a thousand editions. Compare this with the publication in the sixteenth century alone of 25,000 editions in Paris, 13,000 in Lyon, 45,000 in the Germanies, 10,000 in England, 8,000 in the Low Countries, 7,000 in Poland, and 32,000 to 92,000 in the rest of Europe.⁵¹

Publications in Greek, printed mostly outside the Ottoman Empire, many of them by authors of the Greek diaspora, grew from 4 or 5 a year between 1701 and 1730 to 7 a year between 1731 and 1740, 11 a year between 1741 and 1750, 17 a year between 1751 and 1770, 28 or 29 a year between 1771 and 1800, and 65 a year between 1801 and 1820. Serbian works in Cyrillic published outside the Ottoman state rose from 6 a year between 1761 and 1785 to 19 a year between 1786 and 1820, 37 a year between 1821 and 1840, and 61 a year between 1841 and 1850.⁵²

50 Robin Okey, *Eastern Europe, 1740–1980: Feudalism to Communism*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1982]), 17.

51 C. Th. Dimaras (Konstantinos Demaras), "L'apport de l'*Aufklärung* au développement de la conscience néo-hellénique", Association Internationale d'Études du-Sud-Est Européen, *Les Lumières et la formation de la conscience nationale chez les peuples du Sud-est européen*, Actes du Colloque international organisé par la Commission de l'AIESEE pour l'histoire des idées, sous les auspices et avec le concours financier de l'UNESCO, Paris, 11–12 avril 1968, (Bucharest, 1970), 54; Richard Clogg, "The Greek Mercantile Bourgeoisie: 'Progressive' or 'Reactionary'?", *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, ed. R. Clogg, (Totowa, N. J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981), 96; Traian Stoianovich, "Material Foundations of Preindustrial Civilization in the Balkans," *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, III, 29–30; Traian Stoianovich, "Society and the Reason of Language," *Balkan Studies* 40/1999, 70, 77–78.

52 Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme (XVe–XVIIIe siècle)*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), 304; Paul Fox, *The Reformation in Poland: Some Social and Economic Aspects*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1924), 68–73; Stoianovich, "Material Foundations of Preindustrial Civilization in the Balkans", *Between East and West*, III, 29–30.

The resumption of the print cultures of the Balkan peoples through the efforts of their diasporas was part of the process of the diffusion to the Balkans of the Enlightenment and of the option of Balkan elites for European models of culture, conceived as being in conformity both with their own aspirations and with a cultural past that Ottoman rule had curtailed.⁵³ Accompanying this resumption was the emergence of rival “legislators”—nomothetes—of language. Each aspirant group of legislators attributed to the script, orthography, language, and rhetoric most likely to fulfil its own interests and desires, the quality of “sacredness”—as the heritage of an ancient culture (archaic, archaizing, classical, or ecclesiastical), as a link with a people’s “true” past (Latin rather than Slavic or Greek, Slavic rather than Greek), or as the voice of the people (the language currently spoken in some district or province or the language most compatible with the proponent’s own vision of what the nation was or should be). For every group of language legislators, its own form of speech, writing, and rhetoric became “sacred.” It was “property.” It was “identity.”⁵⁴

The first Balkan successor states (apart from tiny Montenegro), Serbia and Greece, had to establish from scratch a state structure, curb localism, shift from a mix of subsistence, mercantile, and command economy to market economy, and institute a government of law, periodic censuses, and a system of national education, all on the basis of European (French, Belgian, Swiss, Bavarian, Hanoverian, Würtemberger, Italian, and Prussian) models. How well did the reformers understand their task?

Sociologist Joseph S. Roucek acknowledges that “the decline of Ottoman hegemony” allowed “an inevitable infiltration of western ideas” to Balkan elites but contends that “the predilection for these ideas and the outward re-

53 On the Enlightenment in the Balkans, see Stoianovich, “Society and Reason of Language”, 57–90; Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Enlightenment Century*, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); entire issue of *Balkan Studies* 1/1999, the product of a conference on “Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment: State, Society, and Individual in the Balkans”, organized by Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism in association with the Humanities Department of California State University at Sacramento, 11–12 January 1997; C. Th. Dimaras, *Histoire de la littérature néo-hellénique des origins à nos jours*, ([Athens]: Institut Français d’Athènes, [1996]), 161–229; William O. Oldson, “The Enlightenment and the Romanian National Revival (Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania)”, *Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism/Revue canadienne des études sur le nationalisme*, X, 1 (Spring/printemps), 29–40.

54 Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment Civilization and the Institution of Modern Greece*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 98–103; John B. Allcock, “In Praise of Chauvinism: Rhetorics of Nationalism in Yugoslav Politics”, *Third World Quarterly* 4/1989, 211.

spect accorded democratic forms little more than mimicry." After first suggesting that the Enlightenment may have allowed a *rapprochement* between western Europe and the Balkans, "which for generations had been drifting apart," Robin Okey is sceptical. He bases his conclusion on the "storms of the twentieth century."⁵⁵ Our own reading is different. There was a Balkan Enlightenment. As in western Europe, it was limited to elites. Some elements of that Enlightenment, however, did percolate down to the people. Mimesis sometimes took mistaken forms. But even what looked like a sham was part of a learning process. Often accompanied by critique, the imitation was not that of a parrot. The satirical short stories (1894, 1895) of the boorish misfit parvenu Bay Ganyo Balkanski by the Bulgarian writer Aleko Konstantinov, represent not a rejection of modernity but of a sham of modernity.⁵⁶

Illustrative of the real trend was Jovan Sterija Popović, son of a Greek father and Serb mother. Teacher of "Natural Law" between 1840 and 1842 at the Licej (Lyceum) in Kragujevac and Belgrade, Sterija, as he is usually known, communicated two important principles to his students: freedom of thought (thought as individual property) and freedom of person. "Everyone is one's own," he declared. "No one [is] another's"—*svaki je svoj, niko ničiji*.⁵⁷

In response to constitutionalist movements in Greece and Serbia in the 1830s and 1840s, there arose among urban students, between the 1840s and 1860s, an embryonic liberalism. Derided at first as a "game of children", the protests of Lyceum students in Belgrade played a role in the manufacture of public opinion as early as 1848.⁵⁸ In Greece, Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, an

55 Joseph Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans*, foreword by Fritz Morstein Marx, 1st edition, (New York, London: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 10–11; Okey, *Eastern Europe, 1740–1980*, 36. There is much with which we agree in George Schöpflin's – "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe", *Daedalus* 119/1990, 61, 69—distinction between "the Western tradition of the division of power and the Eastern tradition concentration of power" and in his view that "the power of society" in Eastern Europe (his term) "could not attain the necessary critical mass" by the particular time at which it was needed—in the decades after 1918—in order to effect the necessary "social or ethnic integration" of diverse groups into "a single relatively homogeneous society..., a single public opinion which could exercise control over the political sphere." Without nuance, however, Schöpflin's thesis is unacceptable.

56 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 39–41.

57 *Prirodno pravo Sterije Popovića*, ur. Ljiljana Subotić, (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, Odeljenje za društvene nauke, 1995), 44, 48, and the introduction by Radomir D. Lukić, "Jovan Sterija, profesor prirodnog prava na Liceju", 9, which had originally been published in *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu* 1/1957, 1–13.

58 Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830–1880", *Between East and West*, IV, 20–21.

ideology of nationalism, defending expansion as a right of self-determination and/or of political and economic necessity, similarly took shape.⁵⁹ By the 1890s or 1900, a “Modernist” movement was manifest in Serb and Croat literature.

The parliamentary regimes that grew out of the written charters and constitutions adopted in Wallachia, Moldavia, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria between 1830 and 1879 depended on continuing dialogue to reconcile conflicting social, political, and economic desires and interests. The ills that accompanied the formation of Balkan political parties, such as the “spoils” system and the use of politics for purposes of self-enrichment, were not confined to the Balkans. Nor would other ills, namely, the use of state or quasi-state terrorism in disputed territories, such as Macedonia, for rival nationalist and other ideological goals, continue to be forever confined to them.⁶⁰ In regard to mimicry, more to the point are the perceptions of Gale Stokes and Slobodan Milačić. Between 1835 and 1888, affirms Milačić, Serbia advanced from a “feudal [feudalized patrimonial] and colonized society,” from a “condition of quite pronounced *anomie*,” “to a constitutional state of the parliamentary type.” Stoke affirms that Serbia created “a political system at least as advanced as many economically more advanced states.”⁶¹

Constitutionalists in the Balkan successor states aspired to emulate not only European reason of state but also the ideal foundations of the European cultures. Their object was to restore what they regarded as their own Eu-

59 Slobodan Milačić, “Le constitutionnalisme serbe du XIXe siècle: une leçon pour la transition démocratique à l’est”, *Diethnes Epistemoniko Sunedrio, 150 chronia (h)ellenikou koinovouleutikou viou 1844–1994*, Diorganose e voule ton (H)Ellenon, Athena 15–17 martou 1995, (Athens: Dikaio & Oikonomia P. N. Sakkoulas, [2001]), 195–213; Traian Stoianovich, “Comparative Constitutional Evolution in Serbia and Yugoslavia: Desires, Judgements and Signs”, *Diethnes Epistemoniko Sunedrio, 150 chronia (h)ellenikou koinovouleutikou viou 1844–1994*, Diorganose e voule ton (H)Ellenon, Athena 15–17 martou 1995, (Athens: Dikaio & Oikonomia P. N. Sakkoulas, [2001]), 215–227; Richard Clogg, “The Balkan Dimension: Perspectives on the Threshold of the 21st century”, *Diethnes Epistemoniko Sunedrio, 150 chronia (h)ellenikou koinovouleutikou viou 1844–1994*, Diorganose e voule ton (H)Ellenon, Athena 15–17 martou 1995, (Athens: Dikaio & Oikonomia P. N. Sakkoulas, [2001]), 291–296.

60 Traian Stoianovich, “The Social Foundations of Balkan Politics, 1750–1941”, *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics*, eds. Charles Jelavich, Barbara Jelavich, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 317–326.

61 Milačić, “Le constitutionnalisme serbe du XIXe siècle”, 197, 202; Gale Stokes, *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), 2, 306. See also Alex N. Dragnich, *The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia*, (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1978; distributed by Columbia University Press, New York).

ropean identity. Constitutionalists in the more reluctantly reforming Ottoman Empire had a more restricted aim. Their object was little more than to render the Ottoman "political system more rational," writes Metin Heper, to create a stronger, more powerful state.⁶² At least until 1878, the centuries-old Ottoman military heritage and the millet system impeded the creation of a civil society separate from state, religion, and economy. Beginning already earlier but especially thereafter, Ottoman elites—the research of Metin Heper, Şerif Mardin, Selim Deringil, and Usama Makdisi seems to converge in this regard—devised an ideology sometimes called Ottomanism but which dovetailed with what Usama Makdisi calls Ottoman "Orientalism." Simultaneously "a project of power within the empire as... an act of resistance to the same period, the goal of Ottomanism was to fulfil the "civilizing mission" of the Turks, take advantage of their *asabiyya*, or natural political capacity, and sagacity to rule and administer people to terminate the centuries-old uneasy alliance of the state sector and nomadism, embrace instead the current technology but not necessarily the values of the West—achieve a "fusion" of ethnicities (perhaps even religions), and restore the power of the state under the leadership of the Turks, with or against the wishes of their "Orientalized" Arabic and other non-Turkish populations. The goal of Ottomanism was not a civil society.⁶³

The Balkan non-Turkish Christian elites, on the other hand, aspired to a civil society. But they could not have a nearly autonomous civil society without first inventing their nations, creating a political sector that was legitimate in the eyes of the European great powers, of the former European colonizing power, and of their neighbors, and designing an economic sphere able to compete in an expanding world economy.⁶⁴

62 Metin Heper, "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared", *Comparative Political Studies* 2/1992, 169–194; Metin Heper, "Political Dynamics and Constitutional Developments: Turkey Compared with Greece", *Diethnes Epistemoniko Sunedrio, 150 chronia (h)ellenikou koinovouleutikou viou*, 247–252.

63 Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3/1969, 264, 279; Heper, "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy", 170, 177–78, 187–188; Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 19–20, 169–176; Usama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism", *American Historical Review* 107/2002, 769–772, 787–794. Makdisi draws attention to the importance of Deringil's work.

64 On the relationship between political systems, legitimacy, and economic opportunities and successes, see David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 112; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Political Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review* 1/1959, 75–83.

Despite successes in the economic sphere, the Balkan states had to contend with powerful world forces that set limits to their achievements—but only partly for the reason that Stokes attributes to Serbia’s failure in that sphere, its “smallholding” agriculture. Smallholding, indeed, may have laid a basis for the growth of Serbian democracy. We turn therefore to the world forces. In most Balkan non-coastal areas, little commercialization of land occurred before the forced opening by Russia of the Black Sea to international shipping between 1774 and 1829. In Wallachia, the price of farm products destined for export more than tripled between 1770 and 1850.⁶⁵ On the other hand, from 1500 to 1830, observes John R. Lampe, “the coefficient of variation (that is, the standard deviation divided by the mean) between wheat prices in Sofia and Constantinople” never fell below 0.5. In bad years, it jumped to 3 or 4. In contrast, the coefficient of variation for wheat prices in the cities of the Habsburg Monarchy fell from 0.27 in the 1830s to 0.15 in the 1850s.⁶⁶ Little commercialization of land occurred in Bulgaria until after 1830, with a significant rise in land values in the 1850s under the impact of the Crimean War and the social and economic reforms undertaken in the Ottoman Danube *vilayet* (province). In land-locked Serbia, the process was slower. Serbia had vast forests, but it was too far from the seas to be able to turn its timber into a commercially exploitable resource. Serbians therefore turned their forests into farmland on which they grew cereal crops, which they began to export in the 1860s only to be confronted by the world economic crisis and depressed farm prices of the 1870s and 1880s and the competition of the cereals of a commercially widened world. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, explains Brooks Adams, “grain, raised by the most enduring labour in the world, could be thrown without limit on the European market, and, agricultural competition once established, industrial could be only a question of time. The Canal made the importation and the reparation of machinery cheap throughout Asia.”⁶⁷

65 Mircea N. Popa, “La circulation monétaire et l’évolution des prix en Valachie 1774–1831”, *Association Internationale d’Études du Sud-East Européen, Bulletin* 13–14/1975–1976, 229–233, 301, 305.

66 John R. Lampe, “Imperial Borderlands or Capitalist Periphery?”, *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe*, 184. Lampe’s sources are Liuben Berov, “Changes in Price Conditions and Trade between Turkey and Europe in the 16th–19th Centuries”, *Études balkaniques* 2–3/1974, 169–174; David F. Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750–1914*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 116–117.

67 Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilization and Decay: An Essay on History*, (New York: Macmillan, 1898; copyright 1896 by the Macmillan Company), 355.

The per capita foreign trade of western Europe and the world grew five to six times between 1800 and 1910, that of the Balkans only two or three times. Even as they made great strides, the Balkan states again fell behind other areas of the world economically because of the difficulty of forming informed societies in states in which, as late as 1830, well under 10 percent of the population was literate, and because of the scarcity of capital and suitable competitive exports.

The economic crisis of the 1870s and 1880s represented a downward phase in the rearrangement of relationships between the world economic core and the economic semi-peripheries and peripheries. In this Balkan falling behind, Romania temporarily found an export substitute for cereals in petroleum. Greece found one for currants and other products in shipping services. In the downward phase of the 1920s to 1950, however, the Balkan states again fell behind. In this second falling behind, all were almost equally unfortunate. The combined annual exports of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia in metric tons during 1931–1935 equaled those of 1922–1930. The value in Swiss francs of the combined exports, however, was only half as great. The value of imports receded by more than a half. The severity of the negative impact of a long-term downward phase of the economy was particularly great in these small states because a very large part of their gross domestic product (GDP) derived from foreign trade even though their contribution to the aggregate flow of that trade was low and declined further during economic downturns. Unable to form a customs union, they were drawn in the 1930s into the *Grossraumwirtschaft* of Germany, a process that was afoot already before the First World War.

The interwar economic crisis was a crisis of the world capitalist economy. Between 1913 and 1950, the average annual growth in the volume of exports of western Europe was only 0.1 percent, with a negative growth of -2.5 percent in Germany, a growth of 0.2 percent in the United Kingdom, 1.1 percent in France, and 1.4 percent in Italy, compared to a growth of 2.3 percent in the United States, 1.8 percent in the non-European world, and a world average growth of 1.3 percent.⁶⁸ The relative strength of the United States and

68 Traian Stoianovich, "Europe and the Balkans: An Asymmetry of Economies, 1500–1900", Hellenic Centre for European Studies/Centre hellénique d'études européennes, *The European Community and the Balkans/La communauté européenne et les Balkans: Proceedings of the Conference (Corfu, 2–5 July 1993)/Actes du colloque (Corfou, du 2 au 5 juillet 1993)*, 42–44; Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds*, 214–216; Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West: Comparative Experience in Europe and North America*, (New York: W. W. Norton, [1964]), 166; Györgi Ránki, "'Range' and 'Constraint': The Small States

the non-European world in world-economic terms grew, that of the greater European states declined or stagnated; that of the small Balkan states declined drastically.

Whether from a western European or Balkan perspective, one also needs to take note of Alfred L. Kroeber's distinction between a Period I and a Period II of European civilization or European modernity.⁶⁹ The Protestant Reformation may have been part of the process of remodeling modernity. A clearer cut-off point between the two modernities, however, Europe I of liberties (privileges) and Europe II of liberty was the French Revolution. Between the Rhine and the eastern frontiers of Poland and north of the Ottoman Empire, there continued to be numerous partisans of at least some form of liberties long after the fall of Napoleon. Among Orthodox Christians south of the Danube and Sava, advocates of modernity tended to favor Europe II.

The Serbian liberal historian Slobodan Jovanović, heir of a constitutionalist father, aptly distinguished between two types of state, “medieval” and “modern.” In the medieval type, sovereignty emanated from God, and law was pluralist. In the modern type, sovereignty derived from the people, and the state has a foundation not in “blood” but in positive law. The “cultural mission” of the modern state extends to “material culture.” In contrast, “spiritual culture” (*duhovna kultura*) is the affair of each individual.⁷⁰ Jovanović defended a French conception of the state.

In western Europe and the Americas, however, other conceptions of modernity were finding currency as early as the 1880s or 1890s. Identified as *fin de siècle* already at the time of its occurrence, the first end-of-century to be so designated, the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth were a period of transition from one kind of culture to another. They inaugurated a new age of communication and transportation—the telephone, telegraph, phonograph, cinematograph, radio, bicycle,

of the Danube Basin and the International Political and Economic System, 1919–1945”, *Études historiques hongroises*, II, eds. F. Glatz, E. Paplányi, (Budapest, 1985), 255–273; reissued in Ivan T. Berend and Györgi Ránki, *Studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century: Regional Crises and the Case of Hungary*, (Aldershot, Hamp., and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, Variorum, 2002), 255–273.

69 Alfred L[ouis] Kroeber, “Is Western Civilization Disintegrating or Reconstituting?”, *The Nature of Culture*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, [1952]), 406–407.

70 Slobodan Jovanović, *O državi: osnovi jedne pravne teorije*, (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1922), 220–221, 224.

motorcar, and airplane—and a new conception of space and time, relative to that of the perceiver.⁷¹

The new media of communication facilitated the emergence of a new form of sodality prone to respond as a mass not to interests or reflective opinions but to fluctuating moods cultivated by the dissemination of similar music, rumor, news, and grievances. The constitution of "masses" was also a product of the anonymity of bureaucracy, which commoditizes people, administering them as if they were things. Karl Mannheim thus astutely concluded that "dictatorships can arise only in democracies; they are made possible by the greater fluidity introduced into political life by democracy."⁷² A further threat to democracy arose from the belief of its advocates that it could flourish everywhere and would cure or abolish all Evil.⁷³

Prepared by modernity, the new age of communication and transportation heralded an end to modernity or the coming of a new kind of modernity, a postmodernity that sometimes promised to be its fruition but could also be a denial of the earlier modernity or modernities. The new communications technology was bound to produce change. But would the change celebrate continuity, or would it inaugurate a break? The literary critic Paul Valéry characterized modernity as a "melodic" epoch. The half-century since 1890 represented, on the contrary, "a plurality of simultaneous and inseparable meanings." The painter Fernand Léger perceived the new age as an "epoch of contrasts." Gertrude Stein has described it as a time of the "reordering of the earth." The

71 Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 7, 182, 224–226, 241–243, 259–261, 265.

72 Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, (New York: Viking Press, copyright 1963, 1965, by Hanah Arendt), 27–28, 228–230; Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951; copyright Oxford University Press, 1950), 159–164; Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1956; 1992 edition published by Routledge with a preface by Bryan S. Turner), Part III, entitled "The Democratization of Culture" (from the essay in German, "Demokratisierung des Geistes"), 171–246, for the quotation. In regard to bureaucracy in Greece, Adamantia Pollis – "Social Change and Nationhood," *Massachusetts Review* 9/1968, 125 – writes: "...Greece, in the course of her modern history, has been characterized by institutions which functioned within an essentially pre-nation-state cultural framework. The bureaucracy, hallmark of the modern state, was traditional rather than legal-rational. The notion of a bureaucracy implementing impersonal laws in an impartial manner was an alien concept and a violation of the traditional Greek value system." In essence, however, this meant that bureaucracy could treat "friends" and kin "personally" (understanding the group as the "person") and others as things or anonymously.

73 Olivier Mongin, "La démocraties comme violence?" in Bernard Lefort, coordination éditoriale, *De la fin de l'histoire*, (Paris: Éditions du Félin, [1992]), 29–30.

agents of that reordering were World War I and the airplane. Both threatened to abolish rules of centrality and territoriality. “The composition of this war,” she wrote, was different from “the composition of all previous wars.” Instead of “one man in the center surrounded by a lot of other men,” it had “neither a beginning nor an end.” One “corner of the war” was “as important as another.” The war had “the composition of cubism.”⁷⁴

Opponents of Europe II disliked liberty because they perceived it as a generator of arrogance or impudence. For partisans of Europe II, the danger emanated from the turning away of the *fin de siècle* from rationalism toward American or Anglo-American philosophies of pragmatism—toward the voluntarism of William James, the will to believe as one has been shaped to believe or as it may be to one’s advantage to believe, or toward John Dewey’s conception of knowledge as an instrument of empowerment.⁷⁵

Joining to his instinctive pragmatism an appreciation of William James’s philosophical pragmatism and pluralism, Tocqueville’s attachment to individual liberty, Henri Bergson’s emphasis of the non-rational foundations of human cultural energies, and Pierre Joseph Proudhon’s conception of society as a heroic pluralist community and of production as an activity in which one engages not simply to meet needs of consumption—much less to make profits—but as an aesthetic of creativity, a retired French engineer, Georges Sorel (1847–1922), also borrowed from the eighteenth-century Neapolitan thinker, Giambattista Vico, the concept of *ricorsi*. A *ricorso* occurs, he wrote, “when a body declares itself separate from the prevailing civilization.” That separation is one of long duration, and the outcome is not teleological. The character of the new civilization cannot be known in advance. That does not excuse lack of participation in the dialectical process of inventing new cultural forms. A harsh critic of parliamentary government, establishment intellectuals, and “Jewish gold,” impediments to his goals of emancipating the individual and society from state power and monopoly capitalism and initiating a new civilization, he believed in the necessity of a myth of heroic action to be created by the general strike, the right method of struggle to attain a culture of virtue and self-sacrifice the opposite of impudence. Without defining the

74 Paul Valéry, *Regards sur le monde actuel*, (Paris: Stock Delamain et Boutelleau, 1945), 65; Ferand Léger, *Fonctions de la peinture*, (Paris: Éditions Gonthier, [1965]), 52; Gertrude Stein, *Picasso*, (London: Botsford, 1938), 11, 50.

75 Norman Cantor, *Twentieth-Century Culture: Modernism to Deconstruction*, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., [1982]), 91–93. For a Marxist critique of pragmatism, see Harry K. Wells, *Pragmatism: Philosophy of Imperialism*, (New York: International Publishers, [1954]).

final end, he linked it to the means—an energized society engaged in creating an order of freedom as a work of art.⁷⁶

The attack on rationalism became sufficiently “militant and determined” to entice the Sorbonne sociologist Émile Durkheim to give a course on Pragmatism and Sociology. The object of his first lecture, on 9 December 1913, was to explain why an understanding of pragmatism was necessary for “general,” “national,” and “philosophical” reasons. In general, it was necessary as an aid to locating the shortcomings of rationalism. Understanding pragmatism was imperative from a national point of view precisely because French culture was quintessentially rationalist. A total negation of rationalism would be tantamount to a negation of French culture. The earlier European philosophical traditions, namely, rationalism and empiricism, maintained Durkheim, were two different ways of affirming reason and the necessity of judgement—the first by reference to thought, the second by reference to nature—which pragmatism tends to deny. By combining rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism instead of rejecting of one or both of the first two, one may be able to steer the French and European cultures away from self-destruction toward a new creativity, elaborate perhaps a new civilization.⁷⁷

Thorstein Veblen described Western civilization as both “Christian and competitive (pecuniary); and it seems bootless to ask whether its course

76 John L. Stanley, “Introduction” to Georges Sorel, *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics*, translated with an introduction by John L. Stanley, (New Brunswick, N. J., London: Transaction Books, [1984]), 1–6, 14, 25–25, 29; Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, ed. Jeremy Jennings, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1999; trans. from the 3rd ed. of Sorel’s work [1921]; 1st ed. [1906]), 99–100, 233–234; Georges Goriely, *Le pluralisme dramatique de Georges Sorel*, (Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1962), 23, 25, 88, 104–106, 151–155, 202, 217, 222; Irving Louis Horowitz, *Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel*, with a translation of Sorel’s essay on “The Decomposition of Marxism” and a preface to this edition by I. L. Horowitz on “Radicalism against Reason Then and Now [1960s]”, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; London and Amsterdam: Feffer and Simons, Inc., copyright 1961 by Irving L. Horowitz, copyright to the preface of this edition by Southern Illinois University), 53–55, 58–62, 74, 119, 158–161, 168–169, 227; Jack J. Roth, *The Cult of Violence and the Sorelians*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, [1980]), 56–58, 117, 148, 222–223, 240, 256–266; J. L. Talmon, “The Legacy of Georges Sorel: Marxism, Violence, Fascism”, *Encounter* 2/1970, 47–60; Hannah Arendt, *Antisemitism*, (New York, Harcourt, Brace, and World, copyright 1951, 1958, 1966, 1968), 56–79.

77 Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, translated by J. C. Whitehouse, edited and introduced by John B. Allcock, with a preface by Armand Cuivillier, (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–2 and J. B. Allcock, “Editorial Introduction to the English Translation”, xxx. Durkheim’s course was reconstituted from two sets of student notes as *Pragmatisme et sociologie*, (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1955).

is more substantially under the guidance of the one than of the other of these two institutional norms. Hence, if it should appear, as is sometimes contended, that there is an irreconcilable discrepancy between the two, the student of the culture might have to face the question: Will western civilization dwindle and decay if one or the other, the morals of competition of the morals of Christianity, definitely fall into abeyance?”⁷⁸

Made already before the Great War (World War I), predictions of the decline of the West became legion thereafter. In the aftermath of that cruel European civil war and the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany, the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga agreed that a great “cultural crisis” confronted Europe. Christian morality had dwindled. A shift had occurred from the desire to know to the desire to be and thereupon to the desire just to do, act, move, but not necessarily toward a specific end. The critical spirit had declined. He noted for the first time in history the manifestation of a “systematic anti-intellectualism” and the rise of “puerilism,” which he defined as the adaptation of the behavior of adults to that of children, a reversion to the slogan or old Gaelic war rally of the clans. Huizinga understood that what Thomas S. Kuhn later called a “destructive-constructive paradigm” might entail a long destructive as well as a long succeeding constructive phase. He did not know whether or how soon a constructive phase would follow. He was convinced, however, that the cultural dislocation of his time was more fundamental than the cultural crisis that separated Antiquity from the Middle Ages or the Middle Ages from the age of discovery and the formation of state nations.⁷⁹ Was he mistaken?

Responding to the philosophy and tradition of pragmatism, the German political thinker Carl Schmitt, in his *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1927, 1932), declared the political free of principles of morality. The political was an autonomous category. It was to be judged only by the criterion of success. He undermined thereby the theory of state sovereignty and indirectly legitimated the terrorism of private groups emulating the state in order to deprive it of power. An advocate of the culturally *and* historically homogeneous state,

78 Thorstein Veblen, “Christian Morals and Competitive System”, Rick Tilman, *A Veblen Treasury: From Leisure Class to War, Peace, and Capitalism*, (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, copyright 1993 by M. E. Sharpe), 293, 303, reprinted from *International Journal of Ethics* 10/1910, 168–185.

79 [Johan] Huizinga, *Incertitudes: essai de diagnostic du mal dont souffre notre temps*, preface de Marcel Gabriel, traduit du néerlandais par J. Roerbroek, S. J., (Paris: Librairie de Médecis, 1939), 29–40, 105–111, 125–128, 131, 147–156, 175, 184, 221, 229–236; Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., enlarged, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1970]), 66, 85–86.

he decried Slobodan Jovanović's *Gesetzstaat* or state of positive law (Europe II), without direct reference to Jovanović himself, as a promoter of heterogeneity, distrust, and instability.⁸⁰

The crisis of modernity did not leave the Balkans undisturbed. But between 1912 and 1945, a political problem not unrelated to that of achieving economic parity also confronted them. Instead of easing that problem, wars between 1912 and 1922 (the two Balkan wars, World War I, the Russian Revolution, Romanian intervention in Hungary, the Greek expulsion from Smyrna/Izmir, and other conflicts), and the so-called Versailles system or peace and other treaties contributed to a permanent political instability in the Balkans.

Customary Anglo-American and German interpretations of the Versailles system depict it as cruel and unjust peace imposed by the victors upon the losers. The victors, however, were also losers. Nearly all Balkan states, the major exception being Bulgaria, gained territory along with dissident populations. They were given little opportunity to make their enlarged states politically and economically viable. By being made larger but not large enough, they were made weaker. The Minorities Protection treaties, which the nominally victorious Great Powers imposed upon the other states, virtually guaranteed that the new states—three little ethnically heterogeneous victor Austria-Hungaries (Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia)—would be politically unstable. Political instability could have been reduced in several ways: by the formation of an economic confederation larger than the former Austria-Hungary; by a European union of all states, victors and vanquished, founded on the principle of equal but separate, albeit similar cultures; by more thorough population exchanges to assure a relative cultural homogeneity in each political unit; by the application of minority protection treaties to all states or none instead of dispensing the Great Powers of this imposition; by a general agreement to forbid "groupist" political parties of territorially constricted "social integration"; or by some combination of the foregoing. Such solutions probably would have been politically unfeasible. Responsibility for the limited success or failure of parliamentary government in the interwar Balkan states thus falls not just upon the Balkan states but also upon all the Great Powers.

80 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, translation, introduction, and notes by George Schwab, with comments on Schmitt's essay by Leo Strauss, (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, [1976]), published originally as "Der Begriff des Politischen," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 1/1927, 1–33, revised under the same title and published in 1932 by Duncker & Humblot in Munich, from which the English translation was made. See also Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds*, 298–300.

In Austria-Hungary, constitutional government developed later than in the Balkans. Present, moreover, in Austria-Hungary were ethnopolitical tendencies favorable to the formation of political “parties of integration” along ethnic, social, or religious-ethnic lines—that is, of political disintegration whenever such parties had only a narrow territorial foundation – as against the “parties of representation” advocated by the partisans of national unity and Europe II. The persistence of such parties in the successor states transferred to these states in aggravated form the weaknesses of Austria-Hungary.⁸¹ For the agents of ethnic or religious boundary maintenance in subcultures of polyethnic states, especially weak new states, tend to become most dangerous to the existence of these states when their fears grow that their rivals, the agents of state maintenance and advocates of national unity, have a good chance of depriving them of their roles.⁸²

Two other factors, the first of archaic origin and the second a product of modernity, also impeded a satisfactory working-out of political and economic problems. Balkan geography itself, writes Roucek, was “hostile to nation-wide allegiances.” It kept apart communities that were “socially very much alike” and reinforced “ancient patterns of personal leadership.” The second factor was the role of students, marginal and malleable by definition both by their youth and by their knowledge, a possible but uncertain source of empowerment. Important already in 1848, their role grew after 1990 and especially after 1918, as higher education attained European levels and as university students became incubators of opinions easily communicable to the so-called “masses,” from whose ranks many of them came. Depending upon their location, students in the Balkans became the mimetic agents, “vanguards,” according to Roucek, “of two opposing forces—fascism and communism.”⁸³ Fascism and communism were loosely construed, for they also reflected the diverse rural, urban, and regional “populisms” from which many of them stemmed,⁸⁴ fa-

81 Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 176; Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, *American Political Science Review* 1/1959, 94; Stoianovich, “The Social Foundations of Balkan Politics”, 330–335.

82 Arend Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems”, *Comparative Political Studies* 1/1968, 3–44. See also Richard P. McCormick, “The Jacksonian Strategy”, *Journal of the Early Republic* 1/1990, 1–17.

83 Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans*, 10–11; Okey, *Eastern Europe, 1740–1980*, 36.

84 For a brilliant essay on the conflict between modernity and populism in Greece, see Nikiforos Diamandouros, “Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Postauthoritarian Greece”, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, *Estudios/Working Papers: Estudio/Working Paper 1994/50*,

avorable in varying degree to Europe I or to Europe II. They sometimes favored Europe I because of their proximity to and familiarity with German culture. They could opt for Europe II from feelings of insecurity with German culture as well as for theoretical reasons. In Moldavia, where Russia was close, hostility to communism might have a basis in hostility to Russia or Slavism—in a need to identify with a wider Latinity—and to the presence of a numerous prosperous Jewish urban population, which impeded their own upward social mobility. The communism of many Serbs and Bulgarians doubtless found a basis in a “populist” predisposition to communism and Slavism alike. These are questions, here cursorily introduced, which other contributors to this volume may elucidate, along with the elusive definition of democracy.

Afterword

Dejan Djokić

I received the above article from Professor Traian Stoianovich in January 2003. At the time, I planned to edit a *Festschrift* for Professor Stevan K. Pavlowitch on the occasion of his 70th birthday (in 2003), but this never came to fruition. C. Hurst & Co, the publisher I approached, decided against going ahead with an ‘essays in honour of...’ type of book, notwithstanding a very high esteem in which late Christopher Hurst and his then assistant Michael Dwyer held Professor Pavlowitch, and notwithstanding an illustrious line up of established experts in the field and early career scholars I was able to attract to the project, including Professor Stoianovich (this was, needless to add, thanks to Professor Pavlowitch’s reputation and standing in the field, although he was unaware of my plan, because the book was supposed to be a surprise). Another reason was that I simply became immersed in and eventually overwhelmed by other commitments. At the time I had just published an edited volume with Hurst and was completing a doctoral thesis at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, while simultaneously holding a one year full time lectureship—an equivalent of the post of a *docent* in Serbia—at Birkbeck College, University of London (as a temporary replacement for Professor Mark Mazower, while he was a visiting professor at Princeton University during the 2002/03 academic year). I was also busy applying for

February 1994, presented at a seminar on April 26, 1993. Diamandouros identified Greek populism as an “underdog culture” under constant pressure since 1830 from a rising modernity but which gained ascendancy in Greek politics, along with military dictatorships, between the mid-1930s and 1974.

long term academic jobs—successfully, as it turned out: in September 2003 I took up a permanent Lectureship in Serbian and Croatian Studies at the University of Nottingham, which I briefly interrupted in Spring 2004 in order to take up a semester-long postdoctoral fellowship at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, New York.

My priorities turned to ‘translating’ the PhD thesis (which I defended in early 2004) into a book, as Professor Pavlowitch would say; Anglo-American publishers do not normally publish unrevised theses. I also had to prepare and deliver a full teaching portfolio, and to take on an administrative job as well, as is customary at UK universities. I decided to postpone the Pavlowitch book for the time being, hoping that one day I would return to it (unfortunately, this would not happen). Before I could inform the contributors, Professor Stoianovich, arguably the most eminent among them, had sent me his contribution, typed and printed, by air mail; he did not use, or perhaps rarely used, e-mail.

In his letters, Professor Stoianovich wrote that he would defer to me, as the volume editor, but that he thought his chapter might best serve as a foreword.⁸⁵ (The original title of Stoianovich’s contribution was: ‘Foreword: A Balkan “Archaeology” and the Crisis of Modernity’). I liked the idea, not least because Stoianovich had previously written an excellent introduction to a new edition of L. S. Stavrianos’ classic *History of the Balkans since 1453*, incidentally also published by Hurst.⁸⁶ He courteously added that I, as the editor, together with the publisher, were at liberty to edit the text as we deemed necessary, including perhaps editing it down to a shorter version (I think I asked for 8,000–10,000-word contributions, including notes; Professor Stoianovich’s text was nearly 14,500 words long). Apart from deleting ‘Foreword’ from the original title, moving endnotes to footnotes, and correcting a few minor typos, I have not changed anything, including the US spelling and punctuation (the *Tokovi istorije* editorial team made further minor changes so that the article conforms to the journal house style). The chapter is, to the best of my knowledge, published for the first time, in advance of the 20th anniversary of Profes-

85 Traian Stoianovich to Dejan Djokić, Metuchen, N.J., 12 December 2002, and Traian Stoianovich to Dejan Djokić, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., 8 January 2003, Dejan Djokić’s private archive.

86 Traian Stoianovich, “A Dialogic Introduction”, L[efte]n] S. Stavrianos, *History of the Balkans since 1453*, (London: Hurst, 2000; originally published in 1958 by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston), xxi–xxxii.

sor Stoianovich's death, in December 2005,⁸⁷ and just before the third anniversary of Professor Pavlowitch's passing away in January 2022.⁸⁸

Professor Stoianovich's chapter-turned-journal article is a masterpiece of historical scholarship and a brilliant example of *l'histoire totale*, which made this former PhD student of Fernand Braudel (1902–1985) such an original and influential historian. His works remain a standard reference for students and scholars of the Balkans as well as those working on the history of the *Annales* school. Indeed, Professor Stoianovich's work should be compulsory reading for anyone working on micro history, social history, economic history and global history.⁸⁹ Completed in January 2003, the article has lost none of its originality and relevance. This may have something to do with the nature of Balkan history, but I think it has much more to do with Stoianovich's intellectual brilliance and the fact that he was often ahead of his time. He was a global historian before the 'global turn', and he engaged in dialogue with other disciplines well before cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary approaches became

- 87 Rudolph M. Bell, "In Memoriam: Traian Stoianovich (1920–2005)", *Perspectives on History. The Newsmagazine of the American Historical Association*, 1. 4. 2006; Vlastimir Đokić, „Trajan Stojanović (1921–2005)”, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke* 120/2006, 7–9; Spiros Vrionis Mlađi, „Trajan Stojanović, pionir istorije balkanskih Naroda”, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke* 120/2006, 11–16 (translated by Veselin Kostić, originally published as Speros Vryonis, Jr, "Foreword", Traian Stoianovich, *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, Vols I–IV, (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1992–1995); Donald T. Roden, „Sećanje na Trajana Stojanovića” (Speech at the memorial for Traian Stoianovich, Rutgers University, late April 2006, transl. by Veselin Kostić), Traian Stoianovich, *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, Vols I–IV, (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1992–1995), 17–19 (all articles available online at https://www.maticasrpska.org.rs/stariSajt/casopisi/drustvene_nauke_120.pdf, (accessed 18. 11. 2024); Slobodan G. Marković, „In Memoriam: Traian Stoianovich (1921–2005)”, *Balkanica: Annual of the Institute for Balkan Studies* 38/2008, 307–309.
- 88 Dejan Djokić, „Srbija i Velika Britanija: Ko je bio istoričar Stevan K. Pavlović – kosmopolita i džentlmen srpskog porekla”, *BBC News* na srpskom, 25. 2. 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-60401608>; [Dejan Djokić], 'Professor Stevan Pavlowitch, leading historian of the Balkans who eschewed partisan narratives – obituary', *The [Daily] Telegraph*, online edition 7. 3. 2022, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/obituaries/2022/03/07/professor-stevan-pavlowitch-leading-historian-balkans-eschewed/>; Dejan Djokić, "Afterword", Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*, (London: Hurst, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020 2nd edition; first published by Hurst, 2008), 283–290. See also Mile Bjelajac, „In memoriam: Prof. Dr. Stevan K. Pavlović (Pavlowitch) (1933–2022)”, *Tokovi istorije* 2/2022, 325–329; Jasna Dragović-Soso, „In memoriam: Stevan K. Pavlović (1933.–2022.)”, *Tragovi: Časopis za srpske i hrvatske teme* 1/2022, 223–226.
- 89 See Vlastimir Đokić, „Bibliography of Traian Stoianovich, Professor of the Rutgers State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA/Bibliografija Trajana Stojanovića, profesora Državnog univerziteta Rutgers u Nju Branzviku, Nju Džerzi, SAD”, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke* 120/2006, 35–50.

a thing. In the words of his colleague Professor Rudolf M. Bell (1942–2022), who, incidentally, read an earlier draft of the article published here, ‘Long before deconstruction gained a name, he [Stoianovich] mused upon the relative absence of clocks in the squares of most Balkan cities and explained how it was that people in the region cared less precisely than their western counterparts about the time of day or night.’ Stoianovich’s erudition, his desire to learn and his ability to think outside box left his students and peers alike in awe. Bell remembered him as ‘an extraordinary teacher and colleague, although not for the faint-hearted or light-headed. Stoianovich’s lectures were masterpieces of logical construction, intricately laced with examples and asides’. Another colleague, Professor Donald T. Roden, described Traian Stoianovich as ‘the most original and most stimulating mind of our University.’⁹⁰

In this essay, as in his other works, Professor Stoianovich displays an unrivalled erudition and originality of method and analysis, as he moves effortlessly between different eras of history, between history, archaeology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy and political science, between the Balkans, Europe, and the Near East, and between micro and global history (the latter in direct reference to Professor Pavlowitch, as stated at the beginning of the article), utilising works in English, French, German, and Serbo-Croatian. The reader will learn about the premodern origins of Balkan nations, about discontinuities caused by the Ottoman conquest, and about important continuities that survived it. The section on modernity alone would have made an important intervention in related, ongoing discussions in Serbia and former Yugoslavia. For example, Stoianovich points out that however reformist in nature, Ottomanism was not a civil society and argues, as he has done in his other works, that the Balkans did not remain isolated from and unaffected by the western intellectual revolution. As early as the 1490s first printing presses were introduced in Montenegro, while the ideas of the Enlightenment would reach the Serbs, Greeks, and Romanians, mainly thanks to their compatriots from the Habsburg Monarchy. He also shows how global economic crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries impacted the Balkan economies and societies in both the short and the long run. The discussion about the crisis of modernity in Europe—or, in Professor Stoianovich’s interpretation, two Europes: Europe I of liberties (privileges), favoured in Protestant parts of the continent, and Europe II of the French Revolutionary ideals of liberty, favoured by Bal-

90 Bell, ‘In Memoriam: Traian Stoianovich (1920–2005)’; Donald T. Roden, ‘Sećanje na Trajana Stojanovića’, 17.

kan Orthodox populations is fascinating. His reading of the post-Versailles order is original, and his argument about the Habsburg legacy as crucial to understanding the post-1918 instability is refreshing. Professor Stoianovich was too good of a historian to demonise the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, as many Balkan and East European historians have done; similarly, he does not idealise these two empires either, apparently much lamented in some recent scholarship.

As already mentioned, Professor Stoianovich feared that his text would be too long for the purpose of 'my' volume. In some ways, it was also too short, for it contains enough original ideas and analyses that, if uncompressed, could have filled out an entire book. Written concisely and in readable prose, the chapter would have also made an apt foreword to Professor Pavlowitch's masterful 1999 book *A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945*, to which Professor Stoianovich refers in his article. Indeed, the works by the two historians should be read together. Their methods and the focus of their research differed, but their works and their biographies complemented each other. Both were Serbian academic 'exiles', who also identified with broader Yugoslav and European identities; both were educated in France and both spent their entire, distinguished academic careers teaching at English-language universities (in the US and Britain). Brilliant and erudite, they were modest, kind, encouraging and generous with their time and knowledge when it came to students and colleagues. Both were widely regarded as the world leading experts in Balkan history, as the doyens in the field, yet formal recognition at home eluded them. This was perhaps because they did not seek it, but, I suspect, it had much more to do with the fact that they were both independent thinking, critical intellectuals who did not conform to the dominant ideologies in Serbia, either before or after the collapse of Yugoslavia. At the same time, they approached history of Serbia, Yugoslavia and the Balkans as scholars, and interpreted it in wider, historical and geographic contexts, rather than mostly through the prism of the 1990s Wars of Yugoslav Succession, while refusing to produce instant histories, as many others have done, in and especially outside Serbia.

I have written elsewhere about Stevan Pavlowitch and about the role he played in my career and in my life as an intellectual father figure.⁹¹ I never met Traian Stoianovich, but we corresponded, through 'old fashioned' letters,

91 Djokić, „Srbija i Velika Britanija: Ko je bio istoričar Stevan K. Pavlović”, *BBC News* na srpskom, 25. 2. 2022; [Dejan Djokić], ”Professor Stevan Pavlowitch, leading historian of the Balkans who eschewed partisan narratives – obituary”, *The [Daily] Telegraph*, 7. 3. 2022, Djokić, “Afterword”, Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*.

even though the era of e-mail had already begun. When I moved to New York to take up the postdoctoral fellowship at Columbia, Professor Stoianovich invited me to give a guest lecture at his old department at Rutgers University. He had long retired, but remained active in the intellectual life of the department and his imprint was still strongly felt at the institution. I took a train to New Brunswick, where Professor Stoianovich was going to meet me. Instead, a departmental secretary, carrying a piece of paper with my name written on it, greeted me at the station. Professor Stoianovich had fallen ill and had been admitted to a hospital, she explained, before adding that he telephoned the department several times to make sure that someone would meet me at the train station and take me to the lecture venue. It was April, and most students and academics were on Easter break. But the head of East European Studies at Rutgers, Professor Jan Kubik (who would later serve as the director of SSEES UCL, my alma mater), was there to host me and chair my talk. The hospitality I received was due to a very deep respect that his colleagues held for Professor Stoianovich and had nothing, or perhaps very little, to do with me.

It will always remain a regret that we never met in person, but our communication and the gestures Professor Stoianovich made towards me will be something I will always cherish and remember with a sense of pride. His work, like that of Professor Pavlowitch, has influenced me profoundly. Their publications, many of them now considered classics in the field, are essential readings at my course syllabi and have been read by generations of my students in London, Nottingham, New York and, since last year, in Ireland. I hope that this article, however belatedly published, will be read by students of the Balkans and more broadly historians of Europe alongside previously published works by Professor Stoianovich. I am sure that both Professor Stoianovich and Professor Pavlowitch (who, incidentally, served as a member of the journal's editorial board) would have approved my choice of *Tokovi istorije* as the place of publication. I am grateful to Dr Vladan Jovanović, the journal editor, and his editorial board for accepting Professor Stoianovich's article for publication, together with this explanatory note.

Traian Stoianovich was Emeritus Professor of History at Rutgers University, where he spent his entire academic career (not counting visiting posts at universities in the USA and Europe). After completing his New York University Master's degree in 1949, Stoianovich pursued doctoral studies in Paris under the supervision of Fernand Braudel. In 1952 he defended his thesis on Balkan economic history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He joined Rutgers as an instructor in 1955, earning promotion to assistant pro-

fessor two years later, associate professor in 1961, and full professor in 1967, a post he held until his retirement in 1991. Widely regarded as one of the greatest historians of the Balkans, Professor Stoianovich's publications include *A Study in Balkan Civilization*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967; Serbian edition *Balkanska civilizacija*, translated by Ivana Đorđević, Beograd: Centar za geopoetiku, 1995); *French Historical Method: The 'Annales' Paradigm*, Foreword by Fernand Braudel, (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976); *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1992–1995). Foreword by Speros Vryonis, Jr. 4 Vols: Vol. 1. *Economies and Societies. Lands, Lords, States and Middlemen*, Vol. 2. *Economies and Societies. Traders, Towns, and Households*, Vol. 3. *Material Culture and Mentalités. Power and Ideology*, and Vol. 4. *Material Culture and Mentalités. Land, Sea and Destiny*; and *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe*, (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1994, Serbian edition: *Balkanski svetovi: Prva i poslednja Evropa*, trans. by Ivana Đorđević, (Beograd: Equilibrium, 1997).

Dejan Djokić is Professor of History at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, and the author of, most recently, *A Concise History of Serbia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023, Serbian edition: *Istorija Srbije, od ranog srednjeg veka do danas*, Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2023).

Summary

In this posthumously published essay, Traian Stoianovich traces reasons for the crisis of modernity in the Balkans, from the Late Antiquity to the modern era. His approach is that of *histoire totale*, associated with the French Annales school, to which Stoianovich, a former student of Fernand Braudel belonged, and about which he wrote. The essay moves effortlessly between different eras of history, between history, archeology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy and political science, between the Balkans, Europe, and the Near East, and between micro and global history, utilising works in English, French, German, and Serbo-Croatian. Stoianovich looks at the premodern origins of Balkan nations, at discontinuities caused by the Ottoman conquest and at continuities that survived it. The article makes an important contribution to ongoing discussions about modernity in Serbia and former Yugoslavia. For example, Stoianovich points out that however reformist in nature, Ottomanism was not a civil society and argues, as he has done in his other works, that the Balkans did not remain isolated from and unaffected by the western

intellectual revolution. As early as the 1490s first printing presses were introduced in Montenegro, while the ideas of the Enlightenment would reach the Serbs, Greeks, and Romanians, mainly thanks to their compatriots from the Habsburg Monarchy. He also shows how global economic crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries impacted the Balkan economies and societies in both the short and the long run. The discussion about the crisis of modernity in Europe—or, in Professor Stoianovich’s interpretation, two Europes: Europe I of liberties (privileges), favoured in Protestant parts of the continent, and Europe II of the French Revolutionary ideals of liberty, favoured among nineteenth century Balkan Orthodox peoples – forms a central part of the article. Stoianovich also revisits the post-Versailles order and the Habsburg legacy in an attempt to explain the post-1918 instability in the Balkans, and elsewhere.

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Резиме

Трајан Стојановић

БАЛКАНСКА „АРХЕОЛОГИЈА” И КРИЗА МОДЕРНОСТИ. ПОГОВОР ДЕЈАНА ЂОКИЋА

Апстракт: У овом постхумно објављеном есеју, професор Трајан Стојановић истражује разлоге за кризу модерности на Балкану, од касне антике па до модерног доба. Стојановић приступа теми како из микроисторијске перспективе, тако и са становишта транснационалног и глобалног историчара који је непрекидно у дијалогу са другим дисциплинама. Он разматра начин развоја премодерних балканских нација и њихових средњовековних држава под утицајем царских освајања (римског, византијског и османског). Указујући на (дис)континуитете и анализирајући балканска друштва током османског периода, он разматра и питање друштвено-економске заосталости. Супротно устаљеним схватањима, идеје просветитељства стигле су на Балкан и утицале на регион који је, додуше, покушао да копира спољне, иностране моделе. Након протестантске реформације, а нарочито Француске револуције, у интерпретацији Трајана Стојановића у Европи су се појавила два модела модерности: „Европа I“ (Европа слобода, односно привилегија) и „Европа II“ (Европа слободе). Стојановић тврди да су међу православним хришћанима на Балкану поборници модерности били склонији идеалима Европе II.

Кључне речи: Балкан, модерност, Европа, Османско царство, просветитељство, *тотална историја*

Професор Трајан Стојановић у овом постхумно објављеном есеју истражује разлоге за кризу модерности на Балкану, од касне антике до савременог доба. Његов приступ *тоталне историје*, повезан је са француском школом Анала, којој је Стојановић као бивши студент Фернанда Бродела припадао и о којој је писао. Есеј дискретно прелази кроз различите историјске епохе, између историје, археологије, антропологије, социологије, филозофије и политичких наука, између Балкана, Европе и Блиског истока, али и између микро и глобалне историје, користећи радове на енглеском, француском, немачком и српскохрватском језику. Стојановић разматра премодерно порекло балканских нација, прекиде изазване царским (римским, византијским, османским) освајањима

и континуитете који су их надживели. Чланак представља значајан допринос текућим расправама о модерности у Србији и бившој Југославији. На пример, Стојановић указује на то да османизам, без обзира на своју реформистичку природу, није представљао цивилно друштво, и показује, као и у другим својим радовима, да Балкан није остао изолован од утицаја западне интелектуалне револуције. Још у последњој деценији петнаестог века, штампарске пресе су уведене у Црну Гору, док су идеје просветитељства доспеле до Срба, Грка и Румуна углавном захваљујући њиховим сународницима из Хабсбуршке Монархије. Стојановић такође показује како су глобалне економске кризе из деветнаестог и двадесетог века краткорочно и дугорочно утицале на балканске економије и друштва. Расправа о кризи модерности у Европи, или по интерпретацији професора Стојановића, две Европе: „Европе I“ слобода, односно привилегија, која је била фаворизирана у протестантским деловима континента, и „Европе II“, идеала слободе из Француске револуције, која је имала велики утицај међу православним хришћанским народима 19. века, чини централни део чланка. Стојановић такође разматра постверсајски поредак и хабсбуршко наслеђе, настојећи да објасни нестабилност која је наступила након 1918. године на Балкану и шире.