ABSTRACT: The article focuses on the key determinants and substantive features of Yugoslav-American relations following the accession of President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. Special attention is given to the strengthening of the Non-Aligned Movement, which culminated in the Cairo Conference, and to the positive international resonance of that event for Yugoslavia's global standing. This paper is based on archival research conducted using relevant collections from the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as on a wide range of specialized academic literature.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, United States, Josip Broz Tito, Lyndon B. Johnson, Nikita Khrushchev, Non-Aligned Movement, Cairo Conference

SUMMARY: During the presidency of John F. Kennedy, U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia was based on the concept of “soft power,” that is, the provision of economic and political assistance aimed at encouraging liberalization and distancing the country from the Soviet sphere of influence. Despite the socialist character of the Yugoslav regime, the American administration demonstrated pragmatism and a willingness to cooperate, with the objective of drawing Yugoslavia closer to the West. Lyndon Johnson’s accession to power marked a shift toward a more realist model of foreign policy, grounded in the theories of political realism and based on conditioning assistance on the clear alignment of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy orientation with American strategic interests. Although the conceptual approach differed, the fundamental objective–preserving Yugoslavia’s independence and stability through support for Tito’s model of “independent communism” – remained unchanged. While economic and cultural cooperation remained stable, political relations became increasingly cautious on both sides. The United States maintained its skepticism toward Yugoslav communism, whereas Yugoslavia voiced ever more open criticism of American interventionist policies. Johnson’s policy preserved the basic framework of Kennedy’s approach, but with greater pragmatism and altered priorities. Yugoslav foreign policy remained flexible, balancing between the blocs and consistently relying on the principles of non-alignment throughout the Cold War.