ABSTRACT: This paper explores Yugoslavia’s unexpected decision to participate in the 1976 Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe, analysing the broader foreign policy context that shaped its engagement. The Yugoslav leadership viewed the conference as an opportunity to assert their core foreign policy principles within the European communist movement. Closely aligned with the Italian Communist Party, Belgrade played a key role in shaping the final document, which formally promoted the autonomy of national communist parties. The conference was widely seen as a success for the so-called autonomist bloc, but this victory proved temporary. The article concludes that while the conference was a symbolic milestone for Yugoslav foreign policy, it ultimately represented a Pyrrhic victory in the broader struggle for autonomy within the communist movement.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, Tito, communism, Europe, autonomy, Berlin Conference 1976, Eurocommunism, Italian Communist Party (PCI), CSCE, Cold War

SUMMARY: Yugoslavia’s participation in the 1976 Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, held in Berlin, marked a significant shift in its previous policy toward the communist movement. After decades of distancing itself from the Soviet bloc and multilateral communist gatherings, the decision to join this meeting came as a surprise. However, as this paper demonstrates, the move did not signal a change in ideological direction but was instead part of a broader Yugoslav foreign policy strategy. During the 1970s, in the context of global détente, Yugoslavia increasingly viewed Europe as a region of special importance. In addition to its key activities in the CSCE process, participation in the communist conference offered another opportunity to promote its core principles, particularly autonomy, equality, non-interference, and the idea of different paths to socialism. In close cooperation with the Italian Communist Party, Yugoslavia played a key role in shaping the final conference document. As a result, the document largely reflected the views of the so-called autonomist bloc, which emphasized the sovereignty of each party. Although the conference proceeded in an atmosphere of apparent unity and agreement on the principle of autonomy, subsequent events showed that the Soviet Union had made more of a tactical than a genuine concession. The Soviets soon began attacking the Western communist parties for their autonomist orientation. Josip Broz Tito attempted to moderate the conflict, but without lasting success. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1980 marked the end of any illusions about the possibility of compromise, and the principles proclaimed in Berlin were left largely unfulfilled. In this sense, the Berlin conference was an important diplomatic victory for Yugoslavia, but also the final moment in which the principles of autonomy had a broader platform within the communist movement. It was a symbolic and short-lived success, a Pyrrhic victory in a struggle that was ultimately lost.