Abstract: The paper examines the behavior of Yugoslavia’s two largest national minorities during the Second World War. It investigates reasons why the new communist authorities after the war did not punish the ethnic Germans and ethnic Albanians equally for their similar collaborationist attitudes.
Keywords: ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche), ethnic Albanians, Yugoslavia, communists, Second World War
Summary
The WWII brought about significant changes to Yugoslavia, most notably the rise of the Yugoslav communists, who entered the conflict aiming for power and societal transformation, solving the national question that had been a major issue during the inter-war period. The communists strove to grant all ethnic groups national rights, so national minorities received every right except for self-determination, that was reserved for the Yugoslav peoples, albeit only in theory. Although the largest national minorities collaborated with the invaders, they were not treated in the same way after the war. The ethnic Germans and ethnic Albanians made up two opposite poles of that policy. Even though their crime was the same, the first received harsh punishment, while everything was forgotten and forgiven to the latter. Individual culpability was established in the majority of instances, yet punishment was nearly universal for the Volksdeutsche and forgiveness almost universal for ethnic Albanians. The first were practically wiped out as a collective body, whereas the latter became increasingly important regional factor that would achieve influence on federal level in the late 1960s. The reasons for this uneven treatment were to be found partly in foreign policy: Germany was still feared as potentially dangerous in the future, while Albania was wooed as a prospective ally and/or member of a larger federation. Part of the reasons was rooted in domestic policy, and they were determined by sheer numbers, the ability to offer armed resistance, the density of minority populations and their share in the overall population in Vojvodina and Kosovo, respectively, the general wealth of each minority, the need to demonstrate the credibility of the new policy of national equality, etc. Although the Volksdeutsche had been included in the policy of national equality since the early 1950s, the majority of them refused to integrate due to painful memories, the failure to restore their property, the continued suspicion and disdain they faced in everyday life, and the fact that their friends and relatives lived abroad. After early resistance, ethnic Albanians accepted the opportunity of integration: inclusion became infiltration, and eventually subversion.