Miloš LECIĆ

University of Regensburg

Milos.Lecic@geschichte.uni-regensburg.de

The Evolution of Anti-Corruption Legislation in Interwar Yugoslavia (1918–1941)

Abstract:

This article maps the legal framework of the anti-corruption legislation in interwar Yugoslavia, by examining the context and contents of the evolving anti-corruption laws in the period 1918–1941. It examines the intentions of the law-makers and the messaging that they wanted to convey through the legislation in a diachronic perspective, as well as the focus of the anti-corruption efforts towards petty corruption versus grand corruption. It poses questions towards the applicability of existing corruption models in the context of interwar Yugoslavia and proposes new directions for studying persisting structural phenomena shaping corruption practices in Southeastern Europe to this day.

Key words: corruption, interwar Yugoslavia, law, anti-corruption, corruption practices, political elites

Summary

This study focuses on the changes in the anti-corruption legislation in interwar Yugoslavia, by identifying and systematically evaluating changes in the laws that were intended to curb corruption. It provides a base for further inquiries into the interplay between corruption events, reactions to them and legal tools in prosecuting them. I argue that even in a setting where the laws were not followed, understanding their development can tell us something about the intentions of the law-makers, their reactions and the messaging that they wanted to convey. It also examines the seriousness of the changing Yugoslav elites towards the anti-corruption effort, by showing the intensity and development of the anti-corruption legislation towards petty corruption, as opposed to grand corruption. Lastly, this study contributes towards the understanding of the “quality of fit” of already established corruption models, such as the principal-agent-client model, in a context of interwar Yugoslavia. This study concludes that the self-enrichment efforts of the elites, through grand corruption, were poorly regulated through the 1920s and only gradually regulated through the 1930s, providing a legitimizing example for the petty corruption of the lower ranks. The process of the simultaneous creation of a new Serbian aristocracy through grand corruption and patronage (the principle), with the subjugation of the bureaucracy’s (agent) loyalty towards political parties, rather than the common good of the society, problematizes the use of established corruption models, such as the principle-agent-client model, during the period of interwar Yugoslavia.