John ZAMETICA

jzametica@yahoo.co.uk

The Elusive Balkan Spark: 28 June 1914, Again and Always

Аbstract:

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo justifiably continues to attract the attention of historians as one of the key events in the history of the modern world. This review essay examines several recent scholarly contributions published in a collection of essays devoted to the theme. It highlights the ongoing controversies and contradictory interpretations surrounding the subject.

Key words: Mark Cornwall, Lothar Höbelt, Andrej Rahten, Danilo Šarenac, First World War, Sarajevo Assassination, Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, Austria-Hungary, Southern Slav question

Summary

The enduring interest of the historical profession in the immediate origins of the First World War is demonstrated yet again in this collection of essays edited by Mark Cornwall. Thus the Sarajevo assassination, the event that “sparked” the conflict, figures prominently as the ineluctable reference point for several essays analysing the wider issues involved. Mark Cornwall places it in the context of the Southern Slav question which he considers to have been “a major cause” of the war. This thesis, however, remains unproven. In laying a heavy emphasis on Serbia as an existential threat to Austria-Hungary, Cornwall fails to take into account the serious regional problems that the Empire was facing in the Balkans by the early summer of 1914, a situation that threatened its Great Power status. He is also unable to substantiate the presumption that Serbia was actively pursuing a policy aimed at amputating parts of Austria-Hungary. Lothar Höbelt, a contributor to this volume, by contrast argues that Vienna’s decision for war was not in consequence of any problems in the southern provinces. He sees the Balkans as the arena in which Austria-Hungary was determined to maintain its Great Power position. Andrej Rahten, like Cornwall, concentrates on the Southern Slav question, his focus being on the “trialist” reform plans supposedly championed by Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his advisers. Those plans, envisaging the creation of a third, Croatian-led Southern Slav unit within the Empire, were according to Rahten seen in Serbia as a major danger. Rahten further suggests that the Sarajevo assassination should be understood in the context of this perception. But Rahten’s arguments are deeply flawed. The evidence that he produces to show Franz Ferdinand’s support for trialism turns out to emanate from a demonstrably untrustworthy source. Moreover, he attributes to Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis himself a statement expressing disquiet about the Archduke’s trialist reform plans, ostensibly made by the former after the Sarajevo assassination. On closer inspection, however, the statement in question is revealed as a speculative comment made decades later by Apis’s nephew Milan Živanović. The essay by Danilo Šarenac purportedly deals with Serbian military intelligence and the Sarajevo assassination, though its main themes have in fact little or nothing to do with the assassination itself. These cover Serbia’s internal politics and crises after the 1903 coup, with particular emphasis on civil-military relations and the Serbian military intelligence network. Only towards the very end of his essay does Šarenac venture to hypothesize that Apis had organized the assassination, not in order for it to succeed, but rather to create a diplomatic problem with Austria for his enemy the Prime Minister Pašić.