Natalija DIMIĆ
Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd
natalijadimic@gmail.com

Purging the Titoists from the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany: The Leonhard Case

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the position of the Yugoslav representatives in Berlin and Yugoslav propaganda in Germany prior to and following the Yugoslav-Soviet split, as well as the mechanisms which the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany used in dealing with the opposition within the party ranks. It follows the activities of a German communist, Wolfgang Leonhard, in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany, his escape to Yugoslavia in 1949, and his arrival to West Germany in 1950. The article is based on the unpublished documents from German and Serbian archives, Wolfgang Leonhard’s memoirs, and relevant literature.

Key words: Wolfgang Leonhard, Yugoslavia, Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany (SOZ), East Germany, Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Ministry of State Security of the GDR (Stasi), Titoism, Party Purges, Yugoslav-Soviet Split

Summary

The Cominform Resolution triggered the process of unification within the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), initiated internal party purges, and accelerated the already activated process of turning the SED into a “party of a new type.” Simultaneously, it changed profoundly the way the Yugoslav Military Mission in Berlin used to work, as well as the nature of Yugoslav-German relations. It also impacted the lives of those German communists who supported the Yugoslav position, including Wolfgang Leonhard, a German communist, member of the SED Central Committee, professor at the Party Academy “Karl Marx,” and a member of the so-called “Ulbricht Group.” Leonhard fled East Berlin in March of 1949 and came to Yugoslavia where he worked in the German section of Radio Belgrade for the next year and a half. In late 1950, he moved to West Germany. He was punished with expulsion from the SED which was followed by thorough investigations into all those who had maintained contacts with him and his fiancé Ilse Streblow. When the newly formed Ministry of State Security became interested in the so-called “Leonhard Case,” criticism and self-criticism were replaced by surveillance and plans for his abduction and transfer to East Germany. Those plans, however, were not carried out. Through a biographical analysis of Wolfgang Leonhard, this paper seeks to highlight the mechanisms through which the East German party combated its “internal enemies,” as well as the tactics employed by Belgrade in order to break through the blockade that followed the Cominform Resolution.