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Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 1971–1975*

Abstract: The paper analyzes the determinants and political implications of the different approaches of Yugoslavia and the two superpowers to the policy of bipolar détente and the optimal strategy of eliminating hotbeds of world crises during the first half of the 1970s. The clear discord between Yugoslav foreign policy on this issue and the current bloc strategy was a serious obstacle to the advancement of political and economic cooperation of Yugoslavia with the big superpowers and the safeguard of Yugoslav independence and nonalignment.

Key words: Yugoslavia, USA, USSR, détente, settlement, North-South, economic development, nonalignment, discrimination

A new and specific period in the history of international relations, often characterized as an era of bipolar détente between the two superpowers and general relaxation of international tensions began at the beginning of the 1970s. For the first time in the post war history of international relations, an American president visited the Soviet Union and P. R. of China and attended the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. At that time, the PR of China was finally admitted to the United Nations becoming a permanent member of the Security Council instead of the representative of the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

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According to the policy endorsed by Belgrade and numerous official statements made by Tito, such a positive change in international relations represented an important victory for the principals and goals which Yugoslavia and all the nonaligned countries, as well as peace movements and organizations in the world, supported for years. However, when we analyze Tito's tendency to point out the serious limitations of this process, and occasionally express open doubt about the peaceful intentions of the superpowers, all in the context of undoubtedly very affirmative statements on the process of the bipolar détente of the two superpowers – a certain discord and insincerity of the Yugoslav officials can be noticed. Thus, it seems natural to pose the question: *what were the reasons for such a discord between the formally propagated and the actually desired; that is, what were the reasons for such an evident discord between the numerous Yugoslav appeals to the superpowers to solve their conflicts solely by negotiations and the restrained and somewhat negative Yugoslav perception of certain aspects of the actual bipolar détente.* The answer to this question, actually, explains all the specificity and amorphousness of the Yugoslav international position during the first part of the 1970s and the periodical inconsistency of the Yugoslav officials in the implementation of the basic premises of the nonaligned and non-bloc policy.

The new superpowers' policy on solving world issues and new challenges in the international community, no matter how paradoxical it seemed, actually jeopardized the up to then relatively stable international position of Yugoslavia and its policy of nonalignment. A new reality was established in which Yugoslavia could no longer obtain considerable political and economic benefits from its role of mediator between the USA and the USSR, and the Non-Aligned Movement was not any more in the position to impose itself as the key player in extinguishing the hotbeds instigated by the clash of the two blocs on the territories of third countries. Belgrade assessed that the bipolar détente would have a pronounced negative impact on the future economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USA. There was fear that the Americans would not be so forthcoming in granting economic concessions to Yugoslavia and as cooperative on the issue of Yugoslav financial requests. The USA had previously been exceptionally forthcoming in this regard towards Yugoslavia, because this cooperation was to be a model for economic cooperation with other socialist countries and an incentive to them to lead an independent policy. As the US now established closer relations with the East European countries- its interest for such a strategy diminished.¹

1 Aleksandar Životić, *Vašingtonski pregovori 1951, Jugoslovensko približavanje SAD*, (Beograd, 2015), [*Washington Negotiations 1951, Yugoslav Rapprochement to the USA*,

Tito especially expressed a high degree of discomfort, concern and significant reserve towards the process of the bipolar détente because of his fear that the two superpowers would reach an agreement that would be to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia. Namely, since Yugoslavia was still considered a “grey zone” in Europe, not being clear whether it belonged to the socialist bloc countries or not – there was realistic fear that the Americans would put Yugoslav interests in the background and abandon the previous strategy of support to Yugoslav independence, in order to secure Soviet concessions on some important European and global issues. The current US readiness to accept the Soviet initiative for the convening the Conference on European Security and Cooperation that would finally permanently sanction the de facto situation established in Europe in the post war era (especially the integrity of the existing borders) and the tendency of the two superpowers to draw the political map of the world in direct negotiations, contributed to the fears of the Yugoslav officials. Although Tito endorsed the policy of peaceful coexistence among the blocs in conflict and supported the doctrine of the Richard Nixon, the American president, on the need for confrontation to give way to negotiations, there was fear that the underlined joint cooperativity of the two superpowers would eventually result with their agreement at the expense of small countries.²

(Belgrade, 2015)]; Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944–1974)*, (Beograd, 2014), [*Yugoslavia and the Cold War. Essays on the Foreign Policy of Josip Broz Tito 1944–1974*, (Belgrade, 2014)]; Dragan Bogetić, “Američke analize budućnosti Jugoslavije posle Tita s početka 70-ih godina”, *Tokovi istorije* [“American Analysis on the Future of Yugoslavia After Tito at the Beginning of the 70s,” *Currents of History*], 1/2012, 159–174; Robert D. Šulcinger, *Američka diplomatija od 1900. godine*, (Beograd, 2011), [*US Diplomacy Since 1900*, (Belgrade, 2011)]; Zbornik radova *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, (Beograd, 2010), [Proceedings from *Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, (Belgrade, 2010)]; Momčilo Pavlović, *Dokumenta CIA o Jugoslaviji 1948–1983. Šanse Jugoslavije posle Tita*, (Beograd, 2009), (CIA i slom Jugoslavije), Momčilo Pavlović, *CIA Documents on Yugoslavia 1948–1983. Chances of Yugoslavia after Tito*, (Belgrade, 2009), (*CIA and the Collapse of Yugoslavia*); *125 Years of Diplomatic Relations between the USA and Serbia*, (Belgrade, 2008); Josip Moćnik, *United States-Yugoslav Relations, 1961–80: The Twilight of Tito’s Era and the Role of Ambassadorial Diplomacy in the Making of America’s Yugoslav Policy*, (Bowling Green, Ohio, 2008); *Yugoslavia After Tito*, “From ‘National Communism’ to National Collapse”, US Intelligence Community. Estimate Products on Yugoslavia. 1948–1990; Ivo Visković, “Odnosi Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država”, *Jugoslovenski pregled* [“Relations Between Yugoslavia and the United States of America,” *Yugoslav Review*], XXXII, 1 (1988), 23–45; Dušan Nikoliš, *SAD. Strategija dominacije*, (Beograd, 1985), [*USA. Strategy of Dominance*, (Belgrade, 1985)].

2 Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, (Beograd, 1976), [*International Relations of Socialist Yugoslavia*, (Belgrade, 1976)]; Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, (Beograd, 2012) [*Yugoslav-American Relations 1961–1971*, (Belgrade, 2012)], 321–335.

Thus, when Josip Broz Tito visited the USA in October 1971, he had an important task of convincing President Nixon that the current internal problems of Yugoslavia would soon be localized, the political and economic system consolidated and that Yugoslavia would remain an important factor of stability in Europe and the Balkans. This time, the Yugoslav president was resolute in his attempt to clarify to his hosts the guidelines of the current Yugoslav international strategy and resolve the dilemma of the future American policy towards Yugoslavia. If Nixon's promise given a year earlier in Belgrade reflected his sincere stance on the readiness of the American government to resolutely support the independence of Yugoslavia and its attempts to resolve the economic crisis, then the American president should not oppose the formalizing of such a course with a special joint Yugoslav-American communiqué, that would in a certain way norm the principals underlining the relations between the two countries and a charter that would demystify the new platform of Yugoslav relations with the countries of the Western bloc.³

In that sense, it could be said that the most important part of Tito's visit to Washington took place outside the official talks, during the dinner Nixon organized in Tito's honor in the White House on 28 October 1971. It is a very important and unusual episode, not marked in relevant archival domestic documents but one which is described in detail in the documents of the American State Department.⁴ Tito's suspicion that his closest associates, as well as the translator, may be working for the Soviets, and his insufficient knowledge of the English language – complicated communication with Nixon and William Rogers the Secretary of State. In a complicated way (using a whole series of enigmatic messages) the Americans were asked to confirm in an explicit statement their resolution to continue to give full support to Yugoslav independence and that every attempt to jeopardize it (from the bloc of pro-Soviet countries) would encounter a strong reaction of the USA and NATO. After Nixon finally managed to comprehend Tito's message with visible efforts and constant consultations with Rogers, Nixon together with the Yugoslav President issued a special Joint Statement at the end of the talks that had a more longstanding, broader and different

3 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet predsednika Republike (KPR), 1-2/SAD, Politički aspekti odnosa, Kominike, [Archives of Yugoslavia (AY), Cabinet of the President of Yugoslavia (CPR), 1-2/USA, Political Aspects of Relations, Communique]; Ibid., Unutrašnji razvoj i spoljnopolička aktivnost SAD i SFRJ i njihovo dejstvo na međusobne pozicije i odnose [Internal Development and Foreign Policy Activity of the USA and the SFRY and their Impact on Mutual Positions and Relations].

4 *Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, doc. 233, Editorial Note.

character than was usually the case with these kinds of documents. It is a fact, that American presidents would sign such documents only in exceptional circumstances, which says much about its “political weight”. Since this document represented a long term platform for relations between Yugoslavia and the USA and since it precisely formulated the principles of future USA-Yugoslav relations, as was the case with the document signed in 1955 by Tito and Khrushchev in Belgrade after a long Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, this document modeled on the Belgrade declaration was later often mentioned as the Washington Declaration.⁵

However, judging by the numerous messages the Yugoslav politicians sent to Washington during 1972 and 1973, certain concern was still present in Belgrade that the Americans intended to, in the course of their policy of détente with the Soviets, reach an agreement with them which would be to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia. How much Tito and his associates feared the Soviet intervention, which could be the result of a new phase of East-West relation, could be seen from the talks on this issue, held in utmost secret during 1972 and 1973 between the Yugoslav officials and the new American ambassador Malcolm Toon. Specially indicative were the talk held between the American ambassador and Stane Dolanc, the Secretary of the Executive Committee of LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia), who the Americans all the more saw as Tito’s successor.⁶ Toon reported to his government on his first meeting with Dolanc on 20 May 1972. During the talks, saying “that the United States only condemned the invasion on Czechoslovakia but refrained from doing anything else”, Dolanc openly asked the American ambassador what the US would do if the USSR attacked some other country that was not a member of the Warsaw pact. Toon answered: “that a whole series of factors would influence such a reaction (among others: which specific country was attacked, what the circumstances of the invasion were, if the people of that country were resolute to defend themselves, what the stance of the American public and Congress was) and that because of these factors he was not in a position to give

5 Dragan Bogetić, “Razgovori Tito–Nikson oktobra 1971. Političke implikacije Vašingtonske deklaracije”, *Istorija XX veka* [“Tito–Nixon Talks October 1971. Political Implications of the Washington Declaration”, *History of the XX Century*] 2/2011, 159–172.

6 The Americans considered that Tito had a high opinion of S. Dolanc because he was highly respected both in the Party and in the military, and he unreservedly supported the forces fighting against the disintegration of Yugoslavia. His special positive reference within that framework was that “although being a Slovene, he was acceptable to other nations”. - *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 61.

a concrete answer to such a complex question". Dolans expressed his incomprehension of such an answer and suddenly changed the topic.⁷

Commenting on Dolenc's behavior and the general situation in Yugoslavia, Toon pointed to "very powerful centrifugal forces in that country" and the concern of the Yugoslav leadership that the USSR would use that opportunity as motive for intervention and political involvement. The American ambassador noted that other Yugoslav officials and diplomats also contacted the Americans and asked a similar question (Minister of Foreign Affairs Marko Tepavac in January 1972, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jakša Petrić at the beginning of February and Bogdan Osolnik, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Assembly).⁸

However, at the beginning of the 70s, the Yugoslav side noticed that Brezhnev and his followers also expressed certain interest in the rapprochement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations within the opening process of the bipolar détente and the need of the USSR to strengthen its position on the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Soviet concern over the improvement of American-Chinese relations and Nixon's visit to Beijing, as Soviet exceptional interest for the convening of the European Conference on Security – potentially contributed to the heightened interest of the Kremlin rulers for a more broader cooperation with Yugoslavia. However, at the same time, Belgrade assessed that the Soviet leadership basic premise was that the complete collapse of the Yugoslav model of socialism was near and that such a situation would spur the "healthy forces" (Tito was included in them) to join the socialist bloc and save themselves from the devastating consequences of the economic, national, party and general state crisis. Although Brezhnev and his associates desired such a turn of events, the Yugoslav officials considered that the Soviets were primarily sincerely worried about the possible major international repercussions in case of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership did not want a situation anywhere in Europe which could create a new crisis in East/West relations. They put a lot of effort in the convening the European Conference on Security and Cooperation which would finally sanction the postwar order and the existing boundaries. Now, after two years of intensive activity, they were close to their goal that Europe and the USA would formally acknowledge the state established in Europe after World War II, and the

7 *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, doc. 236, Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, Belgrade, April 20, 1972.

8 *Ibid.*

breakup of the Yugoslav system could induce unfavorable international complications.⁹ Therefore, during his visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971, Brezhnev offered Tito assistance in remediating the “disturbing situation in Yugoslavia”, remarking “that the Soviet Union does not intend or did it ever intend to use force against Yugoslavia”. He insisted on the establishment of Yugoslav-Soviet friendship society, criticized “the anti-Soviet” writing of the Yugoslav press and asked Tito to accept the role of mediator between the USSR and the USA, during his upcoming meeting with Nixon, and convey the Soviet leadership’s message to the American president on their willingness to solve all controversial issues through direct negotiations of the two superpowers.¹⁰

Besides Yugoslav reservations in regards to the bipolar détente, due to concerns that the American-Soviet agreement would be to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia, Tito and his associates were also concerned that the bipolar détente between the USSR and USA would give the two superpowers a sort of monopoly on the resolution of all important international issues. These issues, official Belgrade assessed, would be resolved from a position of power, jointly acknowledged and respected interests, spheres of influence, the balance of nuclear weapons and negotiations, which all seemed much like Kissinger’s ideal of an international order based on the balance and consensus of power and the legitimacy of the most powerful. Such a system of balance of power in the world was not only in

9 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, O unutrašnjoj i spoljnoj politici Sovjetskog Saveza, [AY, CPR, 1-3/USSR, On the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union].

10 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Izlaganje predsednika Titana proširenoj sednici Izvršnog biroa Predsedništva SKJ, održanoj 3. oktobra 1971. na Brionima, [AY, CPR, I-3-a/USSR, President Tito’s Address made before the Session of the Executive Bureau of the Presidency of the LCY held at Brionion 3 October 1971]; Ibid., Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Josipa Broza Tita, Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, generalnog sekretara Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza, održanih u Beogradu, dana 23. septembra 1971. u 9,00 časova, [Shorthand notes of the talks between Josip Broz Tito, President of the SFRY and President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Belgrade at 9:00 a.m on September 23, 1971]; Ibid., Stenografske beleške sa završnih razgovora Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije druga Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, vođenih 24. septembra 1971. god u 21,00 časova u Karadorđevu, [Shorthand notes of the final talks between Josip Broz Tito, President of the SFRY and President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev held in Karadorđevo at 21:00 on September 2, 1971].

direct collision with the concept of nonalignment, but also contrary to Yugoslav efforts to involve all countries in the resolution of key international issues on equitable basis. Therefore, Tito kept criticizing the limitations of the bipolar détente and the tentativeness of the solutions accepted by the superpowers against or contrary to the wishes of other countries. The bipolar détente was, in its essence, a negation of the Non-Aligned Movement as an important an independent international factor.¹¹

During the afore mentioned Tito–Brezhnev talks held in Belgrade in September 1971, Brezhnev tried to persuade Tito to forge closer ties with the pro-Soviet bloc countries because the Yugoslav nonaligned policy was allegedly losing its *raison d'être* by the opening of the bipolar détente.¹² Negating the significance of the Non-Aligned Movement, he openly expressed his opinion: “Nehru died, Nasser died, you are the only one left. So, there is little chance of you keeping the nonaligned countries together”.¹³ The Soviet politicians were unanimous in their view that without the existence of a global system of socialism, it would not be possible to conduct the non-aligned policy nor possible to form the Non-Aligned Movement. Consequently, they saw the close bonding of the nonaligned countries to the socialist bloc and the USSR as the basic prerequisite for the survival of such a policy and the realization of its goals. In that spirit, during Tito’s talks held in Moscow in June 1972, the Soviet side presented an assessment of the scope of the bloc policy and the nonaligned countries in the bipolar détente process, as well as the significance of the American President Nixon’s meeting with the Chinese and Soviet officials.¹⁴

However, while the direct personal contacts of the leaders of the three most powerful countries were rated as “a significant incentive for the relaxation of tension in the world and the strengthening of international cooperation”, when the American Secretary of State

11 Nikoliš, *SAD. Strategija dominacije [USA. Startegy of Dominace]*; Bogetić, „Američke analize budućnosti Jugoslavije” [“American Analysis on the Future of Yugoslavia”], 159–174; Visković, „Odnosi Jugoslavije” [“Relations of Yugoslavia”], 23–45; Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat [Yugoslavia and the Cold War]*, 357–383.

12 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Stenografske beleške sa završnih razgovora [AY, CPR, 1-3-a/USSR, Shorthand notes of the final talks].

13 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Izlaganje predsednika Tita [AY, CPR, 1-3-a/USSR, President Tito’s Address].

14 AJ, KPR, I-2/53, Materijal o poseti J. B. Tita SSSR, jun 1972 [AY, CPR 1-2/53, Material on the Visit of J. B. Tito to the USSR, June 1972]; “Zajedničko saopštenje o jugoslovensko-sovjetskim razgovorima” [“Joint Statement on Yugoslav-Soviet Talks”], *Borba*, June 11, 1972.

William Rogers visited Yugoslavia the following month,¹⁵ the Yugoslav side also expressed “doubt that this time perhaps it is just a case of establishing a new balance of power and not about new prospects for peace”. The Yugoslav officials thought that the best way to remove such doubts was the necessity to resolve “the burning issues and hotbeds of crisis”. They primarily had in mind Vietnam and the Middle East. Thus, they insisted that ‘warfare in Vietnam be replaced by negotiations and the solution found which would be based on the respect of the legitimate rights of Vietnam to decide on its fate alone’. Concern was voiced that the negotiations of the superpowers would not accomplish much if other countries did not participate in them, even those who economically and military wise did not play a significant role in international relations. “We do not expect only the big and powerful countries to govern the world. They are neither that big nor that powerful. It will be easier for the big countries if they accepted the equitable cooperation of the whole international community not only regarding the issues that concern the whole world, but even in respect to the issues that they are mutually concerned about. There is no issue of bilateral relations between the superpowers, that will not have an impact on the whole world. There is no reliable peace between the superpowers, without the guarantee of peace for the small countries. There is no lasting prosperity for the rich countries, without the accelerated development of the poor”.¹⁶

Roger’s reply to the toast of the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs showed much more cordiality towards the host, then the Yugoslav side expressed towards him, and his flattering appraisal of the relations between the two countries. As to the Yugoslav position that the bipolar détente must expand to the whole international community, and not be reduced to the negotiations between the superpowers – Rogers pointed to the existence of full complementarity between Yugoslav and American views on this question: “We agree that better relations among all countries – the large and small, the weak and powerful – will contribute to achieving peace. That is the essence of the initiative undertaken by President Nixon in the Soviet Union and People’s

15 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DAMSP), 1972, Politička arhiva (PA), SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izveštaj o zvaničnoj poseti Jugoslaviji državnog sekretara SAD V. Rodžersa [Diplomatic Archive Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Serbia (DAMFA RS), Political Archive (PA), USA, f-106, 423 331, Report on the Official Visit of the USA Secretary of State W. Rogers to Yugoslavia].

16 “Zdravica saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove Mirka Tepavca u čast američkog državnog sekretara” [“Toast of Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac in Honor of the American Secretary of State”], *Borba*, July 8, 1972.

Republic of China. That is also an important aspect of President Tito's nonalignment policy".¹⁷

During Tito's talks with Rogers held in his residence in Brioni on 9 July, the principals of the Joint Statement signed by Tito and Nixon in 1971 were reaffirmed.¹⁸ Since that document specified that the differences between Yugoslav and US views on key international problems must not be an obstacle for their bilateral cooperation, the Yugoslav officials in their talks with American diplomats kept insisting that this document must be respected, as they insisted in the talks with the Soviet politicians that the principles of the Belgrade Declaration from 1955 must be respected. The reaffirmation of the principles of the "Washington Declaration" was significant for Yugoslavia, since the USA announced it would harden its policy towards Yugoslavia because the Yugoslav politicians had a tendency to openly criticize and condemn the American policy and see it as the main source of most of the crises that shook the modern world. Rogers endeavored to convince Tito that both sides were in agreement on this issue. At the beginning of the talks, he emphasized that the principles of bilateral cooperation formulated by the two presidents were a steadfast foundations for friendly and stable Yugoslav-American relations.¹⁹

Due to Yugoslav fears that Nixon may have made an agreement with Brezhnev to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia, Rogers thoroughly informed Tito on the fine points of the American-Soviet talks and emphasized a few times the American support to Yugoslav independence and nonalignment and that they did not for a moment abandon this course in Moscow, that is, that there was nothing which that would have negative repercussions on third countries. Rogers drew his host's attention to the point "that President Nixon asked to come to Yugoslavia to con-

17 "Zdravica američkog državnog sekretara Vilijema Rodžersa" ["Toast of American Secretary of State William Rogers"], *Borba*, July 8, 1972.

18 DAMSP, 1972, str. pov., f-2, 92, Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa državnim sekretarom za inostrane poslove SAD Vilijemom Rodžersom, 9. jula 1972. na Brionima [DAMFA, 1972, topsecret, f-2, 92, Note on the talks between the President of the Republic and the US Secretary of State William Rogers in Brioni on July 9, 1972].

19 *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, doc. 238, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, Washington, July 25, 1972; AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-201, Zabeleška o razgovoru, 9. jul 1972. na Brionima, [AY CPR, I -3-a/107-201, Note on the talks in Brioni July 9, 1972]; DAMSP, 1972, PA, SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izveštaj o zvaničnoj poseti Jugoslaviji državnog sekretara SAD V. Rodžersa, [DAMFA, 1972, PA, USA, f-106, 423 331, Report on the Official Visit of US Secretary of State William Rogers to Yugoslavia]. In the communiqué on the talks that Rogers had with the Yugoslav officials it was said that the Joint Tito and Nixon Statement from 30 September 1971 "represents long term basis for cooperation between the two countries". - *Borba*, July 10, 1972.

vince President Tito that we have not made any agreements with the USSR behind our friend's back". In that respect, Rogers underscored "that the USA specially strove that the formulation of the documents they adopted with the USSR did not contain stances which could harm third countries or be interpreted as such, that is, which would give the USSR special rights in any region (...) It was made clear to the USSR that détente, as the mentioned principles of independence, sovereignty and noninterference should apply to all countries in Europe and that the USA would not change its position". Rogers stressed that "there were no private (secret) talks on Yugoslavia".²⁰ Tito was satisfied with this explanation and said: "that Soviets told him the same thing". He emphasized that Brezhnev informed him on his agreement with Nixon to the organize and convene the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.²¹

However, Tito could not accept that détente as the key determinant of modern international relations was exclusively limited to the relations of the two superpowers and territorially to Europe. Brezhnev's explanation followed, after Tito pointed this out him during their next meeting in Kiev in mid November 1973, he said that this was actually about: "an exceptionally wise temporary solution" which would allow the communists to outsmart their ideological enemies in the West because "the imperialist are feverishly fighting to encircle socialism from all sides" and "imperialist strive to deceive us wherever it is possible, wherever they can they want to install their bases (...) They are, it is a ugly word, they are bastards (scoundrels) (...) They are afraid of the offensive of socialism, because they are aware of the power of the working class". In addition, Brezhnev explained to Tito that he opted for the policy of a bipolar détente having in mind the original principals of Marxism-Leninism: "Let's also read Lenin. He supported cooperation with the imperialists. He wrote a letter saying that it was possible to form an alliance with every devil, but one should not to allow the devil to deceive you, you should deceive the devil (...) The long term class struggle is in front of us. We conduct a

20 DAMSP, 1972, PA, SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izveštaj o zvaničnoj poseti Jugoslaviji [DAMFA, 1972, PA, USA, f-106, 423 331, Report f-106, 423 331, Report on the Official Visit to Yugoslavia].

21 *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, doc. 238, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, Washington, July 25, 1972; AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-201, Zabeleška o razgovorima Tito-Rodžers, 9. jul 1972, [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-201, Note on the Tito-Rogers Talks, 9 July 1972]; DAMSP, 1972, PA, SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izveštaj o zvaničnoj poseti Jugoslaviji [DAMFA, 1972, PA, USA f-106, 423 331, Report on the Official Visit to Yugoslavia].

class policy. Some thought that we have started to compromise, that the Soviet Union has embarked on a road of bowing to the USA".²²

It seems that Brezhnev's witty remark best illustrates the background of both the Soviet and American approach to the bipolar détente policy. Tito agreed with Brezhnev that the Soviet approach to cooperation with the West was a "class approach".²³ But, Yugoslavia insisted that the détente must have a universal character, that all interested countries should take part in it on equitable basis, that it must spread to all geographic areas (not only Europe) and it must involve all issues that burden the international relations (that is, not only the issues that the superpowers marked as having current priority of its negotiations).²⁴

One of the key issues that Yugoslavia and the nonaligned countries energetically advocated dealt with the imperative for a radical transformation of the existing system of international relations and overcoming the increasingly wider gap that separated the rich North from the poor South. During the 70s, Tito kept stressing that the bipolar détente policy could not achieve any significant results unless it focused on the resolution of economic backwardness in the world. Thus, he considered that international peace was not sustainable in the circumstances of sharp confrontation between the industrially developed countries and developing countries of the "third world".²⁵

Since the USA and the USSR ignored such demands, the ones that the nonaligned countries persistently tried to place on the agenda, it was decided at the Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers in September 1973, to launch an initiative for convening a Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which would be

22 AJ, KPR, I-2/55, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora vođenih između Predsednika SKJ i Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS L. I. Brežnjeva, održanih 12. novembra 1973. u Kijevu [AY, CPR, I-2/55, Shorthand notes on the talks held between the President of the LCY and the President of the SFRY Josip Broz Tito and the General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. I. Brezhnev held in Kiev on November 12, 1973].

23 Ibid.

24 AJ, KPR, I-2, Put J. B. Tita u Finsku. Nacrt platforme SFRJ za Konferenciju o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji od 8. juna 1973, [AY CPR, I-2. Visit to Finland. Outline of SFRJ's Platform for the Conference on European Security and Cooperation from June 8, 1973]; Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat* [*Yugoslavia and the Cold War*], 357–383.

25 *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu 1974* [*Annual of the Institute for International Policy and Economy 1974*], 53–60, 909–942; Ljubiša S. Adamović, Džon R. Lempi, Rasel O. Priket, *Američko-jugoslovenski ekonomski odnosi posle drugog svetskog rata*, (Beograd, 1990) [*American-Yugoslav Economic Relations after the Second World War*, (Belgrade, 1990)]; *Skupovi nesvrstanih zemalja 1961–1974*, (Beograd, 1974) [*Conferences of Non-aligned Countries 1961–1974*, (Belgrade, 1974)].

exclusively dedicated to the issues of economic development.²⁶ In order to exert pressure on the two superpowers to finally seriously take into account the demands of the “third world”, Yugoslavia supported two moves worthy of respect that the nonaligned countries undertook which seriously questioned the continuation of the process of the bipolar détente and which led to a profound economic crisis from which the Western world has not recovered to this day. The first move was the introduction of an oil embargo to the Western countries (the ones that supported the Israeli occupation of Arab territories), and the second was to increase the price of crude oil on the world market four times.²⁷ The impact of these actions was evident – next year a Special Session of the UN General Assembly was held and it adopted, in accordance with the Yugoslav and the nonaligned initiative, a Declaration on the Establishment of the New Economic Order and International Development Strategy which specify the measures that would lead to the implementation of this project.²⁸

However, the energy crisis caused by the radical actions of the nonaligned countries caused a serious economic crisis, increase in unemployment and inflation in the Western countries, simultaneously the fall of the standard of living and the economic growth rate and in the end turned into a serious political crisis. Thus, it can be said that the bipolar détente was an era when the previous East-West confrontation was somewhat eased, but also an era when a new kind of confrontation began in the international community – the North-South confrontation.

Both superpowers thought that Yugoslavia and the nonaligned countries seriously jeopardized the détente process and the current trend of general relaxation of international tension by its radical policy.

Indeed, such accusations did not explicitly come from Moscow but they were expressed within a broader context on the limited achievements of the nonaligned policy in regards to the initiatives and actions of the “progressive and peace-loving forces” for the advancement of peace

26 AJ, KPR, I-4-a/15, Informacija o IV konferenciji nesvrstanih zemalja; Izveštaj delegacije SFRJ o toku i rezultatima IV konferencije šefova država ili vlada nesvrstanih zemalja [AY, CPR, I-4-a/15, Information on the IV Conference of Non-aligned Countries; Report of the Yugoslav Delegation on the Course and Results of the IV Conference of the Heads of State or Governments of the Nonaligned Countries].

27 Dragan Bogetić, “Nesvrstanost i novi međunarodni ekonomski poredak”, *Marksistička misao* [“Nonalignment and the New International Economic Order”, *Marxist Thought*] 1/1979, 159–176; J. S. Singh, *A New International Economic Order: Towards a Fair Redistribution of the World Resources*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 13–14.

28 *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*: United Nations Assembly document, A/RES/S-6/3201 of May 1, 1974.

and security in the world. The Soviet officials even officially declaratively supported the demands of the nonaligned countries for a radical transformation of the current international economic order. They did so, in order not to lose influence in the developing countries and thus allow the Chinese leadership to impose itself as the protector of the poor and disempowered Afro-Asian peoples.²⁹

However, American officials strongly condemned this Yugoslav and nonaligned countries' policy. The new American President Gerald Ford³⁰ and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly attacked the nonaligned countries for forming a new bloc and bringing the world to brink of a catastrophe at a time when the bloc antagonism between the east and West was weakening and the two superpowers finally entered the détente phase.³¹

Ford and Kissinger characterized the united stance of the nonaligned countries in the UN and the manifold increase of the price of oil as well as the demand of the developing countries for the establishment of a new international economic order as the "tyranny of the majority",

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- 29 AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Neki aktuelni aspekti međunarodnih ekonomskih odnosa i politike SAD [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Certain Current Aspects of International Economic Relations and Policies]; AJ, KPR, I-4-c, Predstojeće zasedanje Generalne skupštine OUN o međunarodnim ekonomskim problemima [AY, CPR, I-4-c, Forthcoming Session of UN General Assembly on International Economic Problems]; DAMSP, 1975, str. pov., f-1, 5. Pregled najnovijeg razvoja situacije u svetu [DAMFA, 1975, top secret, f-1, 5. An Overview of the Latest Developments of the Situation in World]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/29, Tok dosadašnje debate Zasedanja Generalne skupštine UN [AY, CPR, I-5-c/29, Course of the Debate of the Session of the UN General Assembly So Far]; AJ, KPR, I-4-c/2-21, Sedmo specijalno zasedanje UN [AY, CPR, I-4-c/2-21, VII Special UN Session]; AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20 [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20].
- 30 In August 1974, G. Ford took office of the US president, after President Richard Nixon had resigned because of the Watergate Affair – the scandal broke out because Nixon's associates spied on and wiretapped Democratic Party offices and officials.
- 31 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-212, SAD i politika nesvrstavanja. Nastup Predsednika Forda na XXIX redovnom zasedanju GS UN [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-212, The USA and the Non-aligned Policy. President Ford's Address to the XXIX Regular Session of the UN General Assembly]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/21, Sednica Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost. Primena vojnih mera [AY, CPR, I-5-c/21, National Security Council Session. Use of Military Measures]; AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20, Kisindžerov intervju časopisu *Business week*, januar 1975. Izjava o mogućoj upotrebi vojne sile [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20, Kissinger's interview to the journal *Business Weekly*, January 1975, Statement on the Possible Use of Military Force]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/25, Kisindžerov govor u Misuriju, 15. maj 1975 [AY, CPR, I-5-c/25, Kissinger's Address in Missouri, May 15, 1975]; Fordov govor na Universitetu Viskonsin instituta za svetske poslove u Milvokiju, 14. jul 1975, [Ford's Address at the University of Wisconsin, Institute of World Affairs in Milwaukee, July 14, 1975]; H. Kissinger, "A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Durable Peace, An Address made before the 28th Session of United Nations General Assembly", September 24, 1973, *Department of State Bulletin* October 15, 1973, 470.

and openly threatened to military intervene if the energy situation in the world become critical for the West.³²

Since Yugoslavia was specially exposed in advocating this policy, the dispute between the industrially developed countries and the developing countries, inevitably implied a dispute between Yugoslavia and the USA. Washington assessed that Yugoslavia was forced to conform to the general strategy of the Afro-Asian countries in order to keep it leading position in the Non-Aligned Movement. "When the movement becomes more radical, the Yugoslavs are obliged to adopt more radical stances in order to retain their leading position".³³ The disagreement between Belgrade and Washington over the Yugoslav concept for a radical transformation of the existing international economic order was specially intensified in April and May 1974, when the Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN dedicated to problems of raw material and economic development and issues on overcoming the widening of the gap between the rich North and poor South was convened and held.³⁴ During this session the US expressed an increasingly critical stance towards the Non-Aligned Movement and directly connected it with the economic issues – energy crisis and economic crisis in the Western countries. "Not one country" Kissinger said "or a bloc of counties, can unilaterally shape the future (...) The organizing of a group of countries into a bloc will sooner or later, give rise to the potential victims organizing into a contra bloc (...) The transfer offunds from the developed countries to the developing countries, necessary for any hope in progress, can take place only with the support of the technologically developed countries. The policy of pressure and threats will undermine the internal basis of such a support".³⁵

32 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-212, SAD i politika nesvrstavanja. Nastup Predsednika Forda na XXIX redovnom zasedanju GS UN [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-212, USA and the Policy of Nonalignment. President Ford's Address to the XXIX Regular Session of the UN General Assembly]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/21, Sednica Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost. Primena vojnih mera, [AY, CPR, AJ, I-5-c/21, Session of the National Security Council. Use of Military Measures]; AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20, Kisindžerov intervju časopisu *Business week*, januar 1975. Izjava o mogućoj upotrebi vojne sile [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20, Kissinger's interview to the journal *Business Week*, January 1975, Statement on the Possible Use of Military Force]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/25, Kisindžerov govor u Misuriju [AY, CPR, I-5-c/25, Kissinger's Address in Missouri, May 15, 1975]; Fordov govor na Universitetu Viskonsin [Ford's Address at the University of Wisconsin].

33 *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 69, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 25, 1974, 2:37-3 p.m.

34 *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu 1974*, (Beograd, 1975) [*Annual of the Institute for International Politic and Economy 1974*, (Belgrade, 1975)], 54-61.

35 H. Kissinger, „The Challenge of Interdependence, Statement made before the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly”, April 15, 1974, *Department*

During the talks between Miloš Minić and Kissinger in New York, just before the VI Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 15 April, Kissinger said that the USA was ready to help the developing countries but that this issue should be approached from a practical and not ideological position. Minić agreed with this stance, but pointed out that unsustainability of the existing system of international economic relations which “disfavors developing countries”. In his opinion, it was difficult to maintain peace in the world in the circumstances where the gap between the developed and undeveloped countries was constantly increasing, when the prices of industrial goods (coming from the developed countries) kept increasing but the prices of raw material (produced by the other group of countries) kept falling. In reply to Kissinger’s question how he thought it was possible to change such a system, Minić answered that it was possible only with the acknowledgement of the new principles on which the economic relations in the international community should be based – the principles of nondiscrimination, non-reciprocity and preferential treatment in favor of the developing countries. Besides that, it had to be ensured that the natural resources of the developing countries should be used exclusively for their development and not allowed for the profit to be channeled to the developed countries.³⁶

The Yugoslav politician considered that the mentioned American strategy “most clearly shows the limitations of détente between the two superpowers” and “an increased danger for the third world countries, especially the nonaligned” and especially “in the areas where the interest of the two superpowers are not clearly delimited thus in reaching their agreements elements of conflict, competition and rivalry are present”. However, such danger also existed in areas which were strictly demarcated by blocs. Namely, since the bipolar détente implies noninterference in the existing crisis in the opposite bloc or sphere of interest and the resolution of all issues within such a framework, USSR’s reactions to the interference of the USA into the affairs of other countries were limited and mostly of propaganda character (Chile, Cyprus, etc.) It has been noted that, although the USA had a tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of countries they considered belonged to their sphere of interest in the whole postwar period, they have never publically, form

of State Bulletin, May 6, 1974, 477.

36 DAMSP, 1974, PA, SAD, f-124, 418 133, Zabeleška o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV i saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove, M. Minića sa državnim sekretarom za inostrane poslove SAD, H. Kisindžerom, 15. aprila 1974. u Njujorku [DAMFA, PA, USA, f-124, 418 133, Note on the talks held between the president the FEC and Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs M. Minić and the US Secretary of State H. Kissinger in New York, April 15, 1974].

the place of highest authority, proclaimed such actions to be part of their official foreign policy.³⁷ Ford's statement was in many ways reminiscent of Brezhnev's statement given at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Worker's Party, on 12 November 1968, in which he for the first time publicly proclaimed the "Doctrine on the Limited Sovereignty of Socialist Countries".³⁸

These compatible views were evaluated in Belgrade as a logical consequence of the international strategy of the two superpowers resulting from the bipolar détente policy. However, this strategy implied the avoidance of direct confrontations in Europe, but the continuation of the two superpowers interventionist policy on the Afro-Asian continents with the aim of spreading their spheres of interest. That is, the USSR and the USA did not give up the policy of threats and pressure as a means of suppressing undesirable trends in international relations. Ambassador Toma Granfil warned, in his reports from Washington, of a whole series of articles and commentaries in the American Press in which Kissinger and the American officials openly announced a military intervention against the oil producing countries if their policy jeopardized the survival of Western economies. In that regard, Kissinger said in his interview given to *Business Week*,³⁹ discussing the possibility of a military intervention pointed to its undesirability, he nevertheless added: "What we would do if no other means were possible to avoid the financial bankruptcy and collapse of Western structures, I cannot speculate now. I am certain it will not come to that (...) The third world countries must accept the fact that they live in an interconnected world. They cannot insist on the coop-

37 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-212, Neki elementi spoljne politike SAD [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-212, Some Elements of US Foreign Policy]; *Ibid.*, SAD i politika nesvrstavanja [USA and the Non-aligned policy]; DAMSP, 1974, SAD, f-124, 445 570, Govor predsednika Forda na Generalnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija [DAMF, 1974, USA, f-124, 445 570, President Ford's Address before the UN General Assembly].

38 Namely, on that occasion the Soviet leader justifying the intervention in Czechoslovakia as an action taken in the spirit of the principle of "proletarian internationalism", said that the protection of the achievements of socialism in each individual country was an international debt of all communists which entailed helping the socialist country in which socialism was endangered. "Brezhnev's Doctrine" meant that the Soviet Union had an exclusive right to assess whether socialism was endangered in a country or not and then for the sake of its alleged protection – undertake a military intervention. As was the case with the USA, the Soviet authorities had acted in that spirit before but never up till then was such a doctrine openly and publically propagated. - AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, k. 175, Teorija ograničenog suvereniteta. Javne i interne izjave sovjetskih rukovodilaca i karakteristični napisi u štampi [AY, CPR, I-3-a/USSR, k. 175, Theory of Limited Sovereignty. Public and Internal Statements Made by Soviet Leaders and the Characteristic Writing of the Press].

39 AJ, KPR, I-5-c/21-28, Osvrt na Kisindžerov intervju časopisu *Business Week* [AY, CPR, I-5-c/21-28, Review of Kissinger's Interview Given to the Journal *Business Week*].

eration of the western countries and keep waging a war – an economic and political one – against the developed countries”.⁴⁰ Commenting this and many other statements made in the same spirit (on the detailed elaboration of an adequate military plan for intervention in case of new oil price increases and the training of military units for desert warfare and taking of oil fields), Granfil expressed his view saying that their meaning “was mostly of psychological-tactical character “and that their purpose was to serve “as a means of applying pressure on and sending a warning to” the oil producing countries “not to go too far” and not to count on the passivity of the US if the West was put in a critical situation. At the same, linking these statements with Fords statement on the justification of the American intervention in Chile, Granfil warned that they were not just “measures of pressure” but also a “realistic option” that can be activated in case of a negative combination of circumstances. Granfil though that the American threats “should neither be underestimated nor dramatized but seen within the context of a serious domestic situation in the USA and in international relations”. He reminded that the US went into the most sever recession in its history since the economic crisis of the 1930s.⁴¹

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid significant attention to Kissinger’s interview and took seriously his threat to the oil exporting countries and the Non-Aligned Movement in general which supported their policy. They assessed that it “was one more official attempt of the American side to justify and legalize the use of force, even the right to war, in cases when the USA determines that not only are its interests threatened but also those of the western countries in general, regardless of the fact whether they agree with it or not”. What specially concerned the Yugoslav officials was the fact that Kissinger’s blatant attempt to “legalize” the possibility of using force against the nonaligned countries, did not provoke the expected stormy protests and sharp reactions of officials neither in the nonaligned countries nor in the USSR (the reactions in the West and in the American Congress were much sharper). The Yugoslav leadership interpreted the “mild Russian reaction” as its attempt to preserve good relations with the USA at any cost and maintain the current bipolar détente. In regards to that, the American testing of Soviet

40 DAMSP, 1974, PA, SAD, f-124, 461 944, Telegram Ambassade SFRJ u Vašingtonu Državnom sekretarijatu inostranih poslova, 14. decembar 1974 [DAMFA, PA, USA, f-124, 461 944, Telegram from the Embassy of SFRY in Washington to the Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, December 14, 1974].

41 DAMSP, 1974, PA, SAD, f-119, 4475, Telegram Ambassade SFRJ u Vašingtonu Državnom sekretarijatu inostranih poslova, 6. januar 1975 [DAMFA, PA, USA, f-119, 4475, Telegram from the Embassy of SFRY in Washington to the Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs January 6, 1975].

lenience in this case achieved positive results. Both Ford and Kissinger had reasons to be satisfied. As far as the nonaligned countries were concerned, Belgrade assessed that Kissinger with his statement succeeded in causing a certain rift among them and instigated some of the US allies among the OPEC members (Saudi Arabia, Jordan) to redefine their policy towards the other developing countries. The nonaligned countries were now put in an even more delicate situation which required urgent measures to be taken and a necessity to connect with all forces in the world that saw the danger of the current American policy. However, at that moment it seemed difficult to do so.⁴²

On the other side, Washington was not satisfied that Yugoslavia adopted too "radical stances" regarding American foreign policy and not expressing enough understanding for "vital American interests". In that sense, the American ambassador to Belgrade Malcolm Toon, reporting to the State Department his assessment of the current international Yugoslav strategy pointed out that "although the Yugoslavs showed a new awareness and understanding for the sensitive areas of American foreign policy" it should be understood that "the Yugoslav government will always support the communist stance", "that Yugoslavia is a free and independent communist country that is nevertheless anti-imperialistic in its foreign policy course". In addition, it was evaluated that the whole foreign policy strategy of Yugoslavia was in the function of retaining and strengthening its leadership position in the Non-Aligned Movement.⁴³

An opportunity to resolve and overcome serious disagreements between Yugoslavia and the USA occurred during the mentioned visit of the American Secretary of State Kissinger to Belgrade on 4 November 1974. That was the first visit of such a highly positioned American official to Yugoslavia in 1974, that is, during the period when both sides tried to overcome the unsatisfactory situation in bilateral relations caused by different approaches to current hotbeds of world crisis.⁴⁴

42 AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20, Osvrt na Kisindžerov intervju časopisu *Business Week* [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20, Review of Kissinger's Interview Given to the Journal *Business Week*].

43 *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 69.

44 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-215, Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ J. B. Tita sa Državnim sekretarom SAD H. Kisindžerom, održanim 4. novembra 1974. godine [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-215, Note on the talks between the President of SFR of Yugoslavia and US Secretary of State H. Kissinger held on November 4, 1974] i Beleška o razgovoru predsednika SIV - Džemala Bijedića sa Državnim sekretarom SAD dr H. Kisindžerom, 4. XI 1974 [Note on the talks between the President FEC Džemal Bijedić and US Secretary of State Dr. H. Kissinger held on November 4, 1974].

During his talks with Tito and the Yugoslav leadership in Belgrade, Kissinger paid respect to the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment and its active contribution to the greater understanding among nations in search for a peaceful resolution of international problems and conflicts. He stressed that “the USA respects the independence of Yugoslavia, including its independence from the USA”, and “that this can be solved within a broad framework (...) to make the cooperation long term”.⁴⁵

Tito and Kissinger agreed that the existing energy crisis cannot be resolved by confrontation but exclusively by constructive cooperation between the developed countries and the developing countries. They agreed that during the VI Special Session of the UN General Assembly a confrontation between these two groups of opposing countries took place but they had a completely different view of who was to blame for this confrontation. According to Kissinger the culprits were the developing countries and according to Tito the culprits were the developed countries. Kissinger saw the solution in closer united approach of consumers in regards to the oil producers and criticized the “egoism of the oil producing countries”. He asked Tito: “What good will the high prices do for the producers, if inflation makes all the good they want to buy more expensive. The money they have earned has to a great extent lost its value. A rational solution must be in the interest of both sides, the consumers and producers”. Tito on the other hand justified the synchronized action of the nonaligned countries for the radical transformation of the existing system of economic relations and the use of oil as a powerful lever in spurring the developed countries to take into account the demand of the developing countries. He underscored that it was the “undeveloped countries who suffered the most. They are the hardest hit. The USA and the USSR were not hit that much”.⁴⁶

Kissinger agreed that those countries were hit the hardest but he pointed out that they “cannot just press a button and the problem will be solved overnight (...) The injustices that took place in the previous century can not be corrected overnight (...) not even in five years. The atmosphere of confrontation is not a good way to continue”. He said that “if the proposals are reasonable, we will support them”, but having in mind that the developing countries have gone too far in their demands so “the proposals have become unreasonable” the USA is forced to vote against them. Kissinger supported a “comprehensive approach” of resolving the situation that was not conducive to anyone. He stressed that it was a unique paradox that “the USA favored

45 Ibid.

46 *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 71. Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, November 4, 1974.

global planning, but the Soviet Union favored a free market". He announced that he would endorse the undertaking of concrete measures that will allow them to break the vicious circle of confrontation that was utterly "useless".⁴⁷

The cooperativeness that the USA and the USSR showed in resolving the contentious issues that burdened relations in Europe – during the final summit stage of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, was of great significance for the improvement of relations between the two countries. The Final Act of the conference, often called the European Charter, due to its far-reaching importance, was adopted in Helsinki where the summit was held from 30 July to 1 August 1975. This document has in its essence taken the role of peace agreement the superpowers did not manage to agree on after the end of the Second World War. The principles of the nonaligned policy have to a great extent been incorporated into the Final Act (respect for full sovereignty, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states, refraining from the threat or use of force, non intervention in internal affairs), as well as the goals the nonaligned countries supported: overcoming the bloc division, democratization of international relations, indivisibility of world peace – linking the security in Europe with the security of the rest of the world.⁴⁸

Tito and the other Yugoslav representatives, who took a very active part in the Conference were satisfied with the results of the gathering on the whole. Thanks to the relatively united activity of the group of seven nonaligned and neutral countries (Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland) among which Yugoslavia was specially active – the Conference adopted the proposal on the need for a continuation of the conference and the need to hold periodic meetings of the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even after the Conference was finished. The final decision on this was postponed for the first meeting of this kind, that was to take place in Belgrade in 1977. Thus, special recognition was paid to Yugoslavia, not only for its constructive initiatives at the CSCE but also for its mediating role in times when it seemed that it would be difficult to attain mutually acceptable compromises between the confronted blocs.⁴⁹

47 Ibid.

48 Šulcinger, *op. cit.*, 304; Đuro Ninčić, "Evropska povelja", *Međunarodna politika* ["European Charter", *International Policy*], 1–16 August 1975; Ljubivoje Aćimović, "Evropski principi", *Međunarodna politika* ["European Principles", *International Policy*], 1 October 1975.

49 AJ, KPR, I-4-d, Konferencija o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji, *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu 1975*, (Beograd, 1976) [AY, CPR, I-4-d, "Conference on European Security and Cooperation", *Annual of the Institute of International Policy and Economics 1975*, (Belgrade, 1976)], 34–36, 63–94.

Nevertheless, Tito in his speech delivered before CSCE expressed a doze of skepticism on the future scope of decisions adopted at the conference, if the omnipresence of the current bipolar détente and the dominant role of the two superpowers was still felt: “our expectations will only be realized if this process is spread to all parts of the world and includes all the most important international issues and if all countries equally participate in it, regardless of their size, degree of development and socio-political system. The current positive trends in the political relaxation of tensions would very quickly be faced with a crisis, if the detente was reduced to communication between the blocs instead of becoming a form of communication of all peoples on the basis of respect, independence, sovereignty, equality and noninterference in the internal affairs”.⁵⁰

The officials in Belgrade kept expressing a large doze of skepticism towards all forms of international settlements that were a reflection of the bipolar and not a multilateral détente. However, they thought that CSCE in regards to its general achievements did significantly transcend the bloc and regional barriers. The Yugoslav delegation focused a large part of its activity on achieving a consensus about the stance that the European cooperation and European security be discussed and regulated within a broader geographic and political framework. Special importance was given to the inclusion of the Mediterranean component into the concept of European security, since it was difficult to ensure security while the Mediterranean was the scene of confrontation of the superpowers and the hotbed of violent local conflicts (the Middle East crisis, the Cyprus crisis). The Yugoslav efforts in regards to these issues were adopted and incorporated in the Final Act, in the Preamble of the chapter dedicated to issues of security and the Principle Ground Rules of the operating section on the military aspects of security.⁵¹

Tito and his associates saw the basic weakness of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki in the fact that because it was a compromise of the three global political approaches (Eastern, Western and the third world), it was too general, broadly formulated, imprecise, unclear and based on partial solutions. That was understandable to a certain extent because the complex issues considered, required first a general agreement to be reached in principle and then to move on to a concretization. Thus they

50 “Govor predsednika Tita na Konferenciji o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji u Helsinkiju” [“President Tito’s Address before the Conference on European Security and Cooperation”], *Borba*, August 1, 1975.

51 *Godišnjak Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu 1975*, (Beograd, 1976) [*Annual of the Institute of International Policy and Economics 1975*, (Belgrade, 1976)], 90.

had high hopes for the Belgrade meeting to be held in 1977 where it was expected that each group of issues, that have broadly been regulated by the Final Act in Helsinki would be fully treated.⁵²

Immediately after the Helsinki conference, Tito had another opportunity to influence the superpowers in that direction and to once more express his impressions and discuss the main topics of the Helsinki Conference in his meeting with President Ford in Belgrade. Both statesmen manifested a high dose of cooperation regarding these and other important issues connected to the advancement of bilateral cooperation. Thus, that meeting played an important role in the efforts of both sides to improve the Yugoslav-American relations and suppress the mutual disagreements into the second plane.

Tito, supported Ford's opinions on the "positive impact of the Helsinki concept" on the resolution of key international problems, and expressed his view on the role of the forthcoming Conference on European Security to be held in Belgrade in 1977. He boasted: "All the international conferences held in Belgrade have been successful. For example, the first conference of nonaligned countries".⁵³

Ford replied with dissatisfaction at the mentioning of the nonaligned countries: "Now they are bigger than the two blocs. It is the biggest bloc now. I think that dividing the world into blocs is not the best way to deal with problems. In the kind of world we live in today, "there can no longer be the kind of confrontation and military activity which took place during your time and mine. I will dedicate myself to eliminating all sources of conflict that can lead to military confrontation. That will be our orientation".⁵⁴

Tito and the Yugoslav leadership taking part in the talks with Ford energetically opposed the American president's view that the Non-Aligned Movement was a third bloc and that the nonaligned countries had provoked a new confrontation and conflict in the world. Džemal Bjedić reacted first: "No, it is not a bloc", and then Tito interrupted saying: "Yes, it is not a bloc". Kardelj went even further and warned Ford: "Much

52 AJ, KPR, I-4-d, Konferencija o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji [AY, CPR, I-4-d, Conference on European Security and Cooperation].

53 AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa Predsednikom SAD, Njegovom ekselencijom gospodinom Gerald R. Fordom, održanih 3. avgusta 1975. u Beogradu [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Shorthand notes of the talks held between the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito and his Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford in Belgrade August 3, 1975]; *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 73, Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975.

54 Ibid.

depends on you for it not to become a bloc. We should talk and not confront each other". Kissinger tried to overcome the undesirable tension in the talks and the unpleasant atmosphere that was increasingly felt in the communication between the two delegations noting at the expense of the nonaligned countries: "You have become a powerful bloc we must count on, especially as 'discipline' in your bloc is better than in ours". Accepting Kissinger's conciliatory tone, Tito replied: "The discipline has been a little shaky lately but I think we shall cope with the situation, it is not good to be exclusive".⁵⁵

Returning to the topic that was only superficially addressed at the beginning of the talks, the forthcoming Conference on European Security and Cooperation that was to be held in Yugoslavia in 1977, Kardelj pointed out the significance of the consultations and contacts Yugoslav diplomats had with the politicians of participant countries and especially to the cooperation with the USA. Minić added as far as the cooperation with the USA is concerned "the ministries and embassies of the two countries have had close communication and consultations for a longer time" and "that it had proved to be very useful and that we can further intensify such contacts". Ford and Kissinger agreed. Kissinger said that they: "attach great importance to the understanding between Yugoslavia and the USA, given the standing of Yugoslavia in the Non-Aligned Movement". That was one of the reasons why Kissinger stressed: "We will do our best to stay in close contact". By that he was not referring to the preparations for the Conference in Belgrade but the VII Special Session of the UN General Assembly, dedicated to the problems of economic development that should be held in September (we hope that we will continue our consultations and that we will consult before the special session next month).⁵⁶

It was of great significance for the USA that Yugoslavia use its influence on the nonaligned countries and developing countries and try to convince them to abandon their radical demands for the establishment of a new international economic order.⁵⁷ Kissinger followed up on Minić's

55 AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Shorth and notes of the talks held between the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito]; *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 73, Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975.

56 Ibid.

57 At that time, the prevailing stance of the American administration which was utterly ungrounded was that the Yugoslav leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement was called into question by the radically inclined nonaligned countries (Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Libya) who asserted themselves as authentic representatives of the "third

initiative reminding him that the two of them had previously arranged “to be in contact before the Special Session, because we would like to avoid confrontations between the nonaligned and developed countries. It is our wish that the Special Session be a really constructive one”.⁵⁸

As far as the Yugoslav side was concerned, it specially positively rated that Ford agreed that the confrontation between adversely grouped countries could be avoided only if all the countries involved in international affairs participated together with a universal approach in addressing all questions that endanger world peace (and not just the ones the two superpowers are interested in). Thus, the joint statement of the two presidents said: “President Tito and President Ford also emphasized that the interdependence of all peoples and countries, the developed and the developing ones, is one of the essential factors in the search for a just and efficient economic development. Reviewing the urgent problems facing mankind in the area of international economic relations, they agreed on the need to increase their efforts to find equitable solutions on the basis of improved international cooperation and respect for the interests of all countries.”⁵⁹

However, the Yugoslav-American summit in Belgrade was followed by a period when due to a whole set of domestic factors in the USA and the USSR and new challenges on a broader international scale, the process of the bipolar détente gradually declined. Ford himself admitted that the term “détente” was prone to be misused and he stopped using it.⁶⁰ The world was once again confronted with the dramatic Cold War tensions and sharper confrontations of the two superpowers. During this

world” and “third bloc” in an uncompromising battle for the rights of the poor South antagonized against the rich North. In that spirit, the officials in Washington considered that the new priorities of the Non-aligned Movement, directed at the radical transformation of the existing system of international relations, inevitably led to the marginalization of Tito’s role in the movement and the favoring of Algerian President Boumediene who suddenly took a prominent position as the host at the Summit of Nonaligned Countries at which the project for the new international economic order was launched. - AJ, KPR, I-5-c/23, Neke američke ocene politike nesvrstanih zemalja; Ibid., I-5-c/14, Samit u Alžiru [AY, CRP, I-5-c/23, Some American Assessments on the Policies of the Non-aligned Countries; Ibid., I-5-c/14, Summit in Algiers].

58 AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Shorthand notes of the talk held between the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito]; *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Yugoslavia, doc. 73, Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975.

59 “Zajednička jugoslovensko-američka izjava” [„Joint Yugoslav-American Statement“], *Borba*, August 5, 1975.

60 Šulcinger, *op. cit.*, 305.

new period in international relations, the USA significantly changed its attitude towards politics and nonalignment. Grouping the nonaligned countries into the pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese and pro-American, the USA attempted to provoke divisions and confrontations in the Non-Aligned Movement, the ultimate goal being to breakup the movement and paralyze the joint actions of the nonaligned countries in the United Nations and in a broader sphere of international relations. Such circumstances seriously jeopardized the up to then relatively positive trend of improvement of Yugoslav-American cooperation, that was characteristic for the final phase of the bipolar détente. The culmination of such a negative turn of events took place when the American ambassador Laurence H. Silberman was proclaimed persona non grata in Yugoslavia and recalled from Belgrade during the summer of 1977.

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Резиме

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Несагласје између југословенских спољнополитичких приоритета и садржајних одредница процеса биполарног детанта 1971–1975.

Апстракт: У раду су анализиране детерминанте и политичке импликације различитог прилаза Југославије и двеју суперсила политици биполарног детанта и оптималној стратегији елиминисања жаришта светских криза током прве половине 70-их година прошлог века. Видно одступање по овом питању у политици Југославије у односу на актуелну блоковску стратегију представљало је озбиљну препреку на путу унапређења политичке и економске сарадње Југославије са великим силама и очувања југословенске независности и несврстаности.

Кључне речи: Југославија, САД, СССР, детант, нагодба, Север–Југ, економски развој, несврстаност, дискриминација

Колико је било тешко ванблоковским земљама да на прави начин реагују на актуелне међународне изазове који су попримали све сложеније обресе, упоредо са настојањима двеју суперсила да избегну непосредну конфронтацију опредељујући се за директне преговоре – најбоље се може сагледати на примеру Југославије.

Југославија се у склопу своје несврстане спољнополитичке оријентације перманентно залагала за ублажавање хладноратовских тензија и упућивала бројне апеле за успостављањем директних личних контаката између лидера двеју суперсила. Али, када је коначно остварен овакав значајан обрт у међународним односима, она је према њему испољавала резервисан став, критиковала његову ограниченост, а повремено и отворено изражавала своју сумњичавост у погледу мирољубивих намера великих сила. Та евидентна несагласност између формално пропагираног и стварно жељеног била је условљена читавим низом посебних спољнополитичких

приоритета којима се Југославија руководила током прве половине 70-их година прошлог века.

Први фактор који је узроковао негативан однос југословенских званичника према биполарном детанту произилазио је из њиховог страха да ће Југославија у новонасталој ситуацији изгубити важну улогу коју је до тада имала у међународним односима – улогу посредника између два супротстављена блока. У условима детанта Југославија није више могла извлачити огромне политичке и економске бенефите из те своје улоге и бити кључни актер у гашењу пожара изазваног сударом САД-а и СССР-а на просторима трећих држава.

Тито је посебно испољавао велику дозу нелагодности, забринутости и значајне резерве према процесу биполарног детанта, због страха од евентуалне нагодбе лидера двеју суперсила која би ишла на штету Југославије. Наиме, пошто је Југославија и даље представљала својеврсну „сиву зону“ у Европи – за коју се није тачно знало да ли припада табору социјалистичких држава или не – чинила се реалном бојазан да ће Американци, ради постизања совјетских концесија око неких важних европских и светских питања, потиснути у други план интересе Југославије, одустати од дотадашње стратегије подржавања југословенске независности и препустити је аспирацијама просовјетског блока држава.

И, на крају, оно што је посебно сметало југословенском руководству било је то што се биполарни детант САД-а и СССР-а сводио на својеврсни монопол те две силе у међународним односима у решавању такоређи свих важнијих питања. Стога је Тито стално критиковао ограниченост биполарног детанта и провизорност решења која су усвајале две суперсиле мимо или чак против воље осталих држава. Биполарни детант у својој бити је представљао негацију Покрета несврстаности као важног и самосталног међународног фактора.