Boris Sergejevič Novoseljcev

Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s

Abstract: Based on published and unpublished archival documents from Serbia and Russia (RGANI), the article focuses on the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the period after 1968 and before Tito's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1972. The author has attempted to convey the dynamics of the development of relations between the two sides and their position in connection with the deterioration of relations after the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia (August 1968).

Key words: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cold War, USSR, Josip Broz Tito, Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, L.I. Brezhnev.

Relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia in the late 1960s to early 1970s were a special case of the general tendency of relations between the parties in the post-war period, reminiscent, in the figurative expression of Leo Mates, of a toy yo-yo. The period under review was the next phase of normalizing relations and clarifying the positions of Moscow and Belgrade after the third Soviet-Yugoslav conflict related to the intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia in August of 1968.

The reasons why the parties had sought to achieve a mutual understanding were different for each of them. For Yugoslavia, this was, above all, a security issue in the context of the formation of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" and the ethnic crisis in Yugoslavia at the turn of the 1960-1970s. Also of concern was the possibility of termination of previously concluded trade and credit agreements and the termination of military cooperation; opposition to initiatives aimed at organizing a regular conference of non-aligned countries and a newly erupted polemic with Bulgaria on the Macedonian issue. Moscow's most important goal was to strengthen its position in the communist movement, shaken after the Prague Spring. At the same time, there was a need to stabilize relations with the West as part of the emerging policy of easing international tension. The fears of the Soviet leadership were also caused by the threat of the emerging conflict with China developing into a full-scale war, the possibility of promoting its influence in the Balkans, and creating an informal alliance between China, Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia there. The likelihood of such a coalition seemed dubious, but there was a thaw in relations between Belgrade and Beijing.

In order to “probe the ground” for normalizing relations, the sides resorted to tried and tested methods – correspondence and negotiations at the level of middle-rank diplomats. The achieved results were also traditionally consolidated during the visit of a major party and state figure: on September 2-6, 1969, A. A. Gromyko visited Yugoslavia. Further, the party-state leaders of the two countries resorted to personal diplomacy. From September 22 to 25, 1971, L.I. Brezhnev was on a visit to Yugoslavia, and from June 5 to 10, 1972 Tito made an official visit to the Soviet capital. This was all the more important for both sides against the background of the visit of U.S. President R. Nixon (in 1970) to the SFRY and J. Broz Tito's return visit to the United States (in 1971).

In an effort to establish dialogue, the parties habitually tried not to dwell on controversial issues, while no one denied the existence of differences in the field of politics and ideology. However, as always, keeping up the appearance of agreement was quite enough for politicians in Belgrade and Moscow.

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